.png)
A review of "Facing the war" by Cornelius Castoriadis (Paul Cardan).
This issue of Telos magazine contains a text by the
French intellectual Cornelius Castoriadis, "Facing the war". The text
was quite notorious in its day.
Small wonder.
Castoriadis was a left-winger, but in "Facing the war" he took the position that the Soviet Union was the most dangerous superpower and militarily stronger than the United States. Castoriadis further claimed that Soviet society was a "stratocracy", an entirely new type of society ruled by the army, with no other goal than conquest for the sake of conquest. This, Castoriadis believed, is a material fact of the Soviet system: the ruling army corpse was compelled to expand its foreign power by its own inner logic. The author further claimed that the military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union was highly efficient (in sharp contrast to the civilian economy). The large number of pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World was seen as proof positive that Moscow is stronger than Washington. "Facing the war" was written shortly after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which Castoriadis believed was a first step in a Russian conquest of Iran, Pakistan or perhaps both. The author emphasized that no reform of the stratocracy was possible. World War Three is inevitable! Since I only read the first part of this work (in a Swedish translation), I'm not sure what Castoriadis wanted people to actually *do* about it, but he seems to have taken a neutral position between the United States and the Soviet Union, perhaps because of his belief in some kind of libertarian socialism. (At one point, he calls the Western systems "liberal oligarchies".)
Despite this, Castoriadis was sharply criticized by many other left-wingers, since his writing sounded pro-American, repeating the arguments of the "hawks" in Washington and elsewhere (including, presumably, president Ronald Reagan). Another parallel would be the slavishly pro-Chinese Maoists, who were also superhawkish during this period, since China was allied with the United States.
Of course, Castoriadis' analysis was sheer hogwash. The text seems to have been written in 1980. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed new secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party. He launched the reform processes known as perestroika and glasnost. In 1991, the entire Soviet Union quite simply collapsed! Yet, only ten years earlier, Castoriadis was assuring his readers that the USSR is immensely stronger than the United States and cannot be reformed from the inside (nor, apparently, can it collapse). The sudden collapse of the entire Eastern Bloc in 1989-91 also revealed the completely decrepit character of the Soviet economy, not just the civilian sector but also the military-industrial complex. Indeed, one of many reasons for the collapse seems to have been the Russian inability to keep even pace with Reagan in the arms race. I'm not sure whether the author ever issued a retraction of his absurd screed, or whether somebody cared asking for one.
In reality, the Soviet Union was always the weaker superpower. When Mossadeq in Iran threw out the Americans, the CIA assassinated Mossadeq. When Sadat in Egypt threw out the Russians, the KGB did...exactly nothing. Soviet support for North Vietnam was substantially smaller than US support for South Vietnam (not to mention the military presence of US troops). Weirdly, Castoriadis admitted this, but since the US lost the war, he nevertheless saw this as evidence for Soviet strength: the Soviet stratocracy was so strong, apparently, that it could just sit idly by, watching the dominoes fall. Many other Third World regimes became pro-Soviet only *after* coming to power *without* Russian aid, Cuba being one example. Outside their East European cordon sanitaire, the Soviet Union was never strong enough to do much, unless invited by local regimes. (The United States could act even without invitation.)
Not even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan disproves this, since the Russians regarded that nation as part of their cordon sanitaire and expected it to be "Finlandized". The idea that the Soviet Union ever had plans to invade Iran and Pakistan are absurd, and equally absurd is the notion that the best way to reach the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf goes through a somewhat steeper elevation in Kandahar (perhaps if the Soviet Army had invaded Tibet, the author would have seen this as the first step to take the Maldives?). Besides, the Soviet Union clearly overreached itself in Afghanistan, the loosing war being another reason why the Soviet system eventually collapsed. Note also that the Soviet Armed Forces lost the war in Afghanistan despite the lack of an anti-war movement in the Soviet Union!
Why did Castoriadis make this elementary error? I don't know, but kremlinology during the Cold War seems to have had a curious double character: on the one hand, the Soviet planned economy was seen as much worse than Western free enterprise, on the other hand, the Soviet military was supposedly stronger than NATO. This doesn't connect: if the planned economy was decrepit, why was it so efficient in the military field? Does central planning work after all...? Castoriadis, who considered himself a socialist, "solved" the problem by suggesting that perhaps central planning does work after all, with the added twist that it's not really socialist at all, but stratocratic.
The reality proved to be more mundane. The Soviet system was stagnant and inefficient *as a whole* and for that reason couldn't keep up with the United States, when that nation finally decided to play it rough. Indeed, it would probably have collapsed anyway, under its own weight.
The writer was prescient on one point only. He pointed out that the Communist Party was simply a cover for Greater Russian nationalism, and that this chauvinist nationalism was subjectively held by the Kremlin rulers and their military-industrial complex. This was confirmed during glasnost when Pamyat became the largest independent mass organization in the Soviet Union, and during the power struggles in post-communist Russia when the "hard liners" donned the Greater Russian mantle without necessarily giving up the Communist designation. Vladimir Putin's re-introduction of the Soviet anthem (albeit with new lyrics) is a symbolic manifestation of the same thing. In their own minds, many Soviet apparatchiks probably were little Czars or petty aristocrats.
However, the "red Czars" proved to be much weaker than the real thing. "Facing the war" was consigned to the dustbin of history after just five years. For good or for worse, the Russian went on facing...Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
Small wonder.
Castoriadis was a left-winger, but in "Facing the war" he took the position that the Soviet Union was the most dangerous superpower and militarily stronger than the United States. Castoriadis further claimed that Soviet society was a "stratocracy", an entirely new type of society ruled by the army, with no other goal than conquest for the sake of conquest. This, Castoriadis believed, is a material fact of the Soviet system: the ruling army corpse was compelled to expand its foreign power by its own inner logic. The author further claimed that the military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union was highly efficient (in sharp contrast to the civilian economy). The large number of pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World was seen as proof positive that Moscow is stronger than Washington. "Facing the war" was written shortly after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which Castoriadis believed was a first step in a Russian conquest of Iran, Pakistan or perhaps both. The author emphasized that no reform of the stratocracy was possible. World War Three is inevitable! Since I only read the first part of this work (in a Swedish translation), I'm not sure what Castoriadis wanted people to actually *do* about it, but he seems to have taken a neutral position between the United States and the Soviet Union, perhaps because of his belief in some kind of libertarian socialism. (At one point, he calls the Western systems "liberal oligarchies".)
Despite this, Castoriadis was sharply criticized by many other left-wingers, since his writing sounded pro-American, repeating the arguments of the "hawks" in Washington and elsewhere (including, presumably, president Ronald Reagan). Another parallel would be the slavishly pro-Chinese Maoists, who were also superhawkish during this period, since China was allied with the United States.
Of course, Castoriadis' analysis was sheer hogwash. The text seems to have been written in 1980. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed new secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party. He launched the reform processes known as perestroika and glasnost. In 1991, the entire Soviet Union quite simply collapsed! Yet, only ten years earlier, Castoriadis was assuring his readers that the USSR is immensely stronger than the United States and cannot be reformed from the inside (nor, apparently, can it collapse). The sudden collapse of the entire Eastern Bloc in 1989-91 also revealed the completely decrepit character of the Soviet economy, not just the civilian sector but also the military-industrial complex. Indeed, one of many reasons for the collapse seems to have been the Russian inability to keep even pace with Reagan in the arms race. I'm not sure whether the author ever issued a retraction of his absurd screed, or whether somebody cared asking for one.
In reality, the Soviet Union was always the weaker superpower. When Mossadeq in Iran threw out the Americans, the CIA assassinated Mossadeq. When Sadat in Egypt threw out the Russians, the KGB did...exactly nothing. Soviet support for North Vietnam was substantially smaller than US support for South Vietnam (not to mention the military presence of US troops). Weirdly, Castoriadis admitted this, but since the US lost the war, he nevertheless saw this as evidence for Soviet strength: the Soviet stratocracy was so strong, apparently, that it could just sit idly by, watching the dominoes fall. Many other Third World regimes became pro-Soviet only *after* coming to power *without* Russian aid, Cuba being one example. Outside their East European cordon sanitaire, the Soviet Union was never strong enough to do much, unless invited by local regimes. (The United States could act even without invitation.)
Not even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan disproves this, since the Russians regarded that nation as part of their cordon sanitaire and expected it to be "Finlandized". The idea that the Soviet Union ever had plans to invade Iran and Pakistan are absurd, and equally absurd is the notion that the best way to reach the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf goes through a somewhat steeper elevation in Kandahar (perhaps if the Soviet Army had invaded Tibet, the author would have seen this as the first step to take the Maldives?). Besides, the Soviet Union clearly overreached itself in Afghanistan, the loosing war being another reason why the Soviet system eventually collapsed. Note also that the Soviet Armed Forces lost the war in Afghanistan despite the lack of an anti-war movement in the Soviet Union!
Why did Castoriadis make this elementary error? I don't know, but kremlinology during the Cold War seems to have had a curious double character: on the one hand, the Soviet planned economy was seen as much worse than Western free enterprise, on the other hand, the Soviet military was supposedly stronger than NATO. This doesn't connect: if the planned economy was decrepit, why was it so efficient in the military field? Does central planning work after all...? Castoriadis, who considered himself a socialist, "solved" the problem by suggesting that perhaps central planning does work after all, with the added twist that it's not really socialist at all, but stratocratic.
The reality proved to be more mundane. The Soviet system was stagnant and inefficient *as a whole* and for that reason couldn't keep up with the United States, when that nation finally decided to play it rough. Indeed, it would probably have collapsed anyway, under its own weight.
The writer was prescient on one point only. He pointed out that the Communist Party was simply a cover for Greater Russian nationalism, and that this chauvinist nationalism was subjectively held by the Kremlin rulers and their military-industrial complex. This was confirmed during glasnost when Pamyat became the largest independent mass organization in the Soviet Union, and during the power struggles in post-communist Russia when the "hard liners" donned the Greater Russian mantle without necessarily giving up the Communist designation. Vladimir Putin's re-introduction of the Soviet anthem (albeit with new lyrics) is a symbolic manifestation of the same thing. In their own minds, many Soviet apparatchiks probably were little Czars or petty aristocrats.
However, the "red Czars" proved to be much weaker than the real thing. "Facing the war" was consigned to the dustbin of history after just five years. For good or for worse, the Russian went on facing...Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
No comments:
Post a Comment