Some speculations on the Book of Revelation I haven´t heard before. Specifically the 144,000. And yes, they are secular-scholarly speculations, not theological. Are the 144,000 actually meant to be Jewish warriors? Note the Qumran connection. Short form: "John" and Paul probably wouldn´t get along very well!
Some interesting speculations in the above videos, but ChatGPT is skeptical. Perhaps rightly, since the channel seems to be Greater Hindu nationalist (Hanuman founded a kingdom in ancient Honduras yeeeeah bruh).
Is there any truth to the claim that Yazidis are actually Hindus or at least that their religion is Hindu-derived? For instance, the peacock angel (peacocks are not native to Kurdistan)?
The claim that Yazidism is derived from Hinduism or that Yazidis are "actually Hindus" is not accurate in a direct historical or theological sense, but there are some interesting parallels and shared motifs that have led people to make such claims.
Yazidism is an ancient, syncretic religion practiced by the Yazidi people, primarily in northern Iraq, with diaspora communities in Turkey, Syria, Armenia, and elsewhere. Its roots are indigenous to the Kurdish region and influenced by:
Pre-Islamic Mesopotamian religions
Zoroastrianism
Islamic Sufism
Possibly early Gnosticism or Manichaean currents
The central figure in Yazidi theology is Tawûsê Melek, the Peacock Angel.
He is considered a manifestation of the divine, a being of light who was cast down but redeemed, similar to the story of Lucifer, Prometheus, or even Shiva in certain interpretive stretches.
The peacock is not native to Kurdistan but was known in ancient Mesopotamia and the Near East through trade and royal menageries. It's native to India and Sri Lanka.
This has led some to draw a connection with Hindu deities, especially:
Kartikeya/Murugan/Skanda, who rides a peacock
Saraswati, who is also sometimes associated with peacocks
But these connections are symbolic rather than historical.
| Element | Yazidism | Possible Hindu Analogy | Reality |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peacock Angel | Tawûsê Melek | Kartikeya/Murugan | Only symbolic similarity |
| Seven angels | Divine beings under God | Sapta Rishis or Lokapalas | Common in many systems |
| Reincarnation | Present in some Yazidi beliefs | Central in Hinduism | Yazidi belief is not systematic |
| Sun veneration | Yes, prayers toward the sun | Surya worship | Found in many ancient cultures |
So while some archetypes and symbols overlap, no direct descent or influence from Hinduism has been demonstrated. Both systems draw on older Indo-European or West Asian mythic patterns that may share a distant cultural ancestry, but Yazidism evolved locally in the Fertile Crescent.
Yazidism is not Hindu and did not derive from Hinduism.
Some symbolic parallels exist (especially the Peacock Angel), but they are coincidental or archetypal rather than proof of a direct connection.
Claims that Yazidis are Hindus in disguise or should be "brought back" to Hinduism are often political or ideological, especially in the context of Hindu nationalist narratives.
Let me know if you’d like a deeper comparison between Yazidi cosmology and Vedic or Shaiva theology.
It appears that the claim about Yazidis and the creation of a "Hindu homeland" called “Kartikstan” primarily originates from viral videos, reaction channels, and fringe narratives, rather than any substantiated movement or credible policy initiative.
Here’s what the information suggests:
Multiple YouTube videos (e.g. by Inspiring Science or other channels) carry the title:
"How Turkey & Iraq Yazidis Are Trying To Create New Hindu Country 'Kartikstan'", or variations like “Yazidis Will Create a New Hindu Country 'Kartikstan'” youtube.com+9youtube.com+9youtube.com+9youtube.comyoutube.com+7youtube.com+7youtube.com+7.
These titles and content appear to be sensational, and often stem from ideologically driven or speculative online communities, not mainstream scholarship or political discussion.
The phrase "Turkey & Iraq Yazidis" likely intends to reference Yazidi communities located in Turkey and Iraq, rather than imply a coordinated Yazidi alliance with Turkey.
The notion of a new Hindu country seems to come from a fringe ideological narrative, often connected to certain Hindu-nationalist or spiritualist movements.
The name “Kartikstan” itself appears to be fabricated and not recognized by any Yazidi groups or official sources.
No credible Yazidi group or leadership has advocated for the creation of a Hindu-identified state.
Turkey has not supported such an idea—in fact, its military actions in Yazidi areas tend to be contentious and security-driven, not supportive of Yazidi autonomy or religious framing kurdistanobserver.comkurdistan24.net.
Yazidism is deeply rooted in ancient Mesopotamian, Iranian, and Kurdish traditions, not Hindu theology en.wikipedia.org.
The claim that Yazidis (in Turkey or Iraq) are creating a Hindu homeland named “Kartikstan” is not supported by any scholarly or political evidence.
It appears to be a misinformation or sensational interpretation, possibly arising from online ideological or religious groups rather than genuine Yazidi intentions.
If you come across any official statements or reputable reporting on this, I’d be happy to re-evaluate them!
 |
| Egypt: Neither White nor Black? |
The North African Neolithic population belonged to a group that is best understood today as part of a "North African" or "Afro-Mediterranean" genetic continuum, rather than a clearly defined "racial" group in the older typological sense. However, if we examine this using modern genetics and anthropology, we can break it down more clearly:
Main Components:
Maghrebi Ancestry (IAM Component): This is a deeply rooted North African genetic component seen in Early Neolithic populations in Morocco (e.g., the Ifri n’Amr ou Moussa or IAM samples, ~7,000 years ago). It's thought to be descended from local Epipaleolithic hunter-gatherers.
European Neolithic Ancestry: Later North African Neolithic populations (e.g., Kelif el Boroud, ~5,000 years ago) show evidence of admixture from Iberian Early Farmers (carrying Anatolian Neolithic ancestry).
Middle Eastern/Levantine Influence: Some gene flow from the Levant, especially during and after the Neolithic, is also present.
Y-DNA and mtDNA Markers:
Y-DNA: Early Neolithic North Africans carried haplogroups like E-M78, typical of Northeast African and Mediterranean populations.
mtDNA: Mitochondrial DNA often included U6 and M1, which are characteristic of North Africa and likely derived from earlier Upper Paleolithic back-migrations from the Near East.
Archaeological evidence shows cultural exchanges between North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, and the Near East.
Neolithic sites in North Africa show a mix of indigenous development and incoming farming technologies, likely from Mediterranean Europe and the Levant.
If one were to try to use the now-outdated 19th–20th century racial categories, Neolithic North Africans might have been classified (in that flawed framework) as:
“Mediterranean” or “Caucasoid”, due to their craniofacial traits and later genetic affinities with Near Eastern and Southern European populations.
However, this concept is now scientifically obsolete. Modern population genetics shows that ancient populations don’t fall into clean, static racial boxes—populations were fluid and mixed over time.
Neolithic North Africans were primarily descended from local North African hunter-gatherers with additional input from Levantine and European Neolithic farmers. They form part of a distinct North African population cluster with some genetic links to both Europe and the Near East, but they were not "black" Sub-Saharan Africans nor simply "white" Europeans. They are best seen as Afro-Mediterranean in ancestry.
Let me know if you'd like a map, specific sample data (like from IAM or KEB), or a comparison to modern North African populations.
I´m away from the web for like four days, and look what happened behind my back. A time of mathematicians finally crack the riddle of existence (no less) or at least time´s arrow. Meanwhile, genetics prove that the Carthaginians weren´t Black (sorry, Afro-centrists) but neither were they Levantine?! Rather, they mostly resemble Sicilians and Greeks.
OK, so maybe I´m gonna stay on the interwebs a bit longer. Time´s arrow and all that...
An Iranian legislator recently said that Iran might close the Strait of Hormuz for international shipping. Since 20% of the world´s oil apparently passes through the strait, it sounds like a credible threat.
And then, maybe not. Iran´s ally China would also be affected by such a move. So would Iran´s own oil exports! So unless the Iranian mullahs have some secret stash somewhere, closing the strait would presumably be a desperate last ditch move. Or an advanced form of self-mutilation...
Well, at least if ChatGPT is to be trusted.
If Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz, it would severely limit its own ability to export oil by sea — including to China, its largest customer. However, there are a few alternative options Iran might theoretically use to export oil, though each comes with major limitations:
~80–90% of Iran’s oil exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea.
Closing it would choke Iran’s own exports, as well as those of Kuwait, Iraq, UAE, and Qatar.
So it's often seen as a threat or pressure tactic, but not sustainable for Iran’s economy.
Iran does not currently have a direct oil pipeline to China.
Possible future projects (like through Pakistan or Central Asia) have faced geopolitical and technical obstacles.
The Iran–Iraq–Syria pipeline (sometimes proposed to reach the Mediterranean) is incomplete and faces war-related disruptions.
Pakistan or Afghanistan routes to China would be highly unstable or politically risky.
There is no viable railway or trucking system to transport oil from Iran to China at the volume and scale required for commercial crude exports.
Logistically and economically inefficient.
This is Iran’s only major alternative: a domestic pipeline from its oil fields to the port of Jask on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz.
Operational since 2021, it allows Iran to export some oil without using the Strait.
However, its capacity is limited — about 1 million barrels per day — far less than total Iranian production.
It’s unclear how much of that oil could be efficiently routed to China specifically.
“Ghost ships” or sanctions-evasion tactics: Iran has sent oil to China using ship-to-ship transfers, false flags, or rebranding oil as from another country. But this is covert, risky, and limited in scale.
Use of Chinese-owned tankers under protection agreements — also limited and politically sensitive.
If Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, it would largely cripple its own oil exports, including to China.
It does have partial workarounds, like the Goreh–Jask pipeline, but not nearly enough to maintain its current export levels.
Such a closure would be a last-resort escalation, likely used as a temporary threat or in a wartime context — not a sustainable long-term strategy.
Would you like a map showing the trade routes and pipelines involved?
Yes, Iran’s economy is heavily dependent on oil exports, though the degree has varied over time due to sanctions, domestic policy shifts, and global market changes.
Oil (and to a lesser extent, natural gas) is Iran’s largest source of hard currency (like dollars and euros).
Revenue from oil exports helps fund imports, stabilize the rial (Iran’s currency), and support government spending.
Historically, up to 40–60% of Iran’s annual government revenue came from oil exports.
Even after sanctions, oil remains a critical pillar of the budget.
For example, in the 2023–2024 budget, oil exports were projected at 1.4 million barrels/day, priced at $85/barrel — a key assumption for fiscal planning.
The oil and gas sector contributes around 15–20% of Iran’s GDP in normal (non-sanction) years.
When sanctions hit, this percentage can drop, but the ripple effect on the rest of the economy (e.g., currency devaluation, inflation) is significant.
U.S.-led sanctions, especially since 2018, slashed Iran’s oil exports from over 2.5 million barrels/day to as low as 300,000–700,000 at times.
Iran has adapted partially by:
Increasing non-oil exports (e.g., petrochemicals, minerals)
Expanding trade with China, often off-the-books or using barter systems
Boosting domestic production and subsidized industries
Yes, Iran’s economy is structurally dependent on oil, especially for foreign exchange and budget revenue.
While it has made efforts to diversify, oil remains its economic lifeline, particularly in international trade.
Would you like a breakdown of Iran’s main trading partners or how sanctions affect daily life in Iran?
