Stalin says: Stop killing Trotskyites!

The United Nations "Human Rights Council" the other day voted for international blasphemy laws. Or something to that effect. The decision was triggered by a recent burning of the Quran outside a mosque in Sweden (by a Christian Iraqi). The resolution was sponsored by Pakistan, a Muslim nation which for a long time has been demanding international blasphemy laws.

Here is an Wikipedia entry on how blasphemy laws are used in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan itself...

Clearly, the UN "Human Rights Council" is some kind of burlesque parody of an actual human rights council!  

List of blasphemy cases in Pakistan

Persecution of Ahmadis

Untergang des Abendlandes?

If the West should be Islamized, let it be Islamized by the Qadiani Ahmadiyya, the Alevites, the United Submitters International or the matriarchal Muslims of Sumatra! If not, no deal.

The view from Lahore

Ahmadiyya is a Muslim movement founded in British India over a century ago by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. The movement was condemned as heretical by "official" Islam, since it seemed to elevate Ahmad to a position identical to, or even superior to, the prophet Muhammad. The Ahmadis are otherwise mostly known for the idea that Jesus survived the crucifixion, travelled to India in search of the lost tribes of Israel, and is buried in Kashmir. After Ahmad's death, the movement split in two branches, usually known as Qadiani Ahmadiyya and Lahore Ahmadiyya. The Qadianis are the "radicals", while the supporters of the Lahore branch are the "moderates".

I admit that I've only read about half of this book, and just skimmed the other half. But yes, Muhammad Ali's "Split in the Ahmadiyya Movement" gives a good overview of the theological differences between the two branches. It's written from a Lahore Ahmadiyya perspective.

The author argues that Ahmad wasn't a full prophet in the same sense as Muhammad, but rather a partial prophet and a religious reformer. He attempts to prove that such partial prophets and reformers can arise even after Muhammad. Thus, Ali wants to square Ahmad's prophetic role with the orthodox Muslim notion that Muhammad was the last and most superior prophet. A large portion of the book is devoted to showing that a prophecy in the Koran attributed to Jesus about a future prophet named Ahmad is a reference to Muhammad. Apparently, the more radical Qadian branch was using this prophecy as proof that Jesus was referring to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad! The author's interpretation is, of course, the traditional one.

Since Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was accused of elevating himself above Muhammad, Ali must also attempt to prove that this was not the case, and that Ahmad's positions were in keeping with orthodox Islam. Ali accuses the Qadianis of regarding all other Muslims as unbelievers, while his own position is that they are not. Yet, Ali still refers to Ahmad as "The Promised Messiah and Mahdi", although I suppose he gives these terms a more moderate interpretation than the standard ones. In orthodox Islam, claiming to be the Mahdi is tantamount to a Christian claiming to be the Second Coming! Of course, the attempts by the Lahoris to harmonize the message of Ahmadiyya with that of orthodox Sunni Islam has largely fallen on deaf ears. Both Ahmadiyya branches have been officially declared non-Muslims in Pakistan.

The book is well-written and relatively easy to read. Anyone interested in the Ahmadiyya split probably has to go through it, so I give it four stars.

Speaking with authority

“The British Government and Jihad” isn't a particularly recent text. Quite the contrary. It was written in 1900 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadiyya movement within Islam. Yet, it has an almost eerie feeling of contemporaneity with our own time.

Ahmad was based in the area today called Pakistan. He sharply rebukes local Muslim scholars for their support of jihad against the British and the Christians. Most of the jihadists seem to be based in the frontier region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the very same area where the Taliban are active today. Ahmad's opposition to jihad was met with fatwas instructing believers to murder him or abduct members of his household. Ahmad explicitly supports the British colonial administration, stating that it's better than the previous rule of the Sikhs, who apparently persecuted Muslims. However, he also criticizes Christian missionaries for fanning the flames of discord in the frontier regions. Indeed, Ahmad believes that the notion of jihad was almost unknown in the area before Christian tracts attacking jihad became widely available. Compare this with the recent idea that Muslim fundamentalism is a product of Western political correctness or Communism. Not convincing, in my opinion.

Ahmad doesn't oppose the wars of conquest carried out by Muslims historically. He regards them as defensive wars to protect Islam from its enemies, who were even more brutal and barbaric. However, Ahmad claims that the era of legitimate holy war has come to an end. His main argument is to assert his own authority. Ahmad claimed to be the “spiritual return” and an “avatar” of both Jesus and Muhammad. He calls himself the Promised Messiah, and even says “I am Jesus the Messiah and Muhammad Mahdi”. According to Ahmad, the Messiah or Mahdi would end all wars. Since *he* is the Messiah, he therefore orders all Muslims to cease waging holy wars…

Needless to say, few Muslims listened to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. His support for the British Raj may have alienated some, but the religious arguments probably loomed even larger. Orthodox Sunni Muslims accused him of elevating himself to a position similar to or greater than the Prophet Muhammad, traditionally seen as the last and greatest of the prophets. Thus, the Ahmadiyya became regarded as apostates. Despite supporting the establishment of the Muslim state of Pakistan in 1947, the Ahmadis were eventually declared non-Muslims in 1974. They currently have more rights in India and…Britain.

Although I personally dislike the pro-British stance of “The Promised Messiah”, I nevertheless consider his pamphlet to be a remarkable indictment of religious fanaticism, and therefore give it four stars.

A modernist attack on the Ahmadiyya

Originally posted on Amazon. 

I haven't seen this particular product, but I have read a similarly-titled item elsewhere. Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) was an Indian Muslim poet, philosopher and politician. He is widely regarded as the spiritual father of Pakistan, and was a leading member of Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League. The Ahmadiyya, a controversial minority group within Islam, claims that Iqbal shared their faith, until he repudiated the Ahmadis for reasons of politic just a few years before his death. In Pakistan, the Ahmadiyya are currently discriminated and regarded as non-Muslims, which makes the Ahmadi claim a political and religious bombshell. Iqbal's criticism of the Ahmadiyya movement is often referenced at various Sunni Muslim websites.

Iqbal's criticism of the Ahmadiyya is a curious blend of seemingly orthodox Sunni Islam and modernist, “liberal” Islam. On the one hand, Iqbal shares the orthodox Muslim position that the Ahmadis are apostates, since they have elevated their founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to a position higher than the Prophet Muhammad. However, Iqbal then proceeds to put a modernist-nationalist “spin” on his rejection of the Ahmadis. Thus, Iqbal interprets the idea that Muhammad was the last and best of the prophets in a “liberal” way, saying that Muhammad was the last human being to whom other humans were bound to submit themselves. After Muhammad, no human person or power can demand absolute submission based on divine authority. Iqbal also says that Muhammad was the highest of the prophets, since his revelation was simple, ethical and completely in keeping with human psychology. Thus, people who “submit” to Muhammad's revelations are voluntarily embracing the most enlightened and rational faith. Ahmadiyya, by contrast, is authoritarian and panders to the primitive superstitions of the uneducated Muslim masses. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be a miracle-working “Promised Messiah”, the movement is led in a top down fashion by his descendants, etc.

Iqbal also has political problems with the Ahmadis. He accuses them of being pro-British and of creating confusion and mischief within the Muslim community in India. At several points, Iqbal compares them to the Babis and Bahais of Persia, which he believes were serving the interests of Czarist Russian imperialism. Iqbal even compares Muslim rejection of the Ahmadis with the Jewish excommunication of Spinoza. The Muslims in India must stand united, and this is made impossible by the machinations of the Ahmadis. Iqbal's concrete proposal is that the British Raj declare the Ahmadiyya to be a separate community, rather than part of the Muslim ditto. This was somehow connected to the election system in British India – presumably, Iqbal didn't want Ahmadis to represent Muslim constituencies. At the same time, Iqbal expresses support for Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, usually (and rightly) seen as a secularist reformer, not even a “modernist” Muslim. I get the impression that Iqbal wanted to turn the Muslims of India into some kind of nation in the modern sense of the term. Perhaps a bit like the Jews, who were turned into a modern Israeli nation by the Zionists?

I'm not sure how widespread Iqbal's modernist-nationalist criticism of the Ahmadiyya is in Pakistan. However, it seems that the entire political establishment from left to right are equally opposed to the Ahmadiyya, so I wouldn't be surprised if the controversies surrounding Allama Iqbal's relation to the Ahmadis will continue for some time to come…

Race traitor?

Abubakr Ben Ishmael Salahuddin is an African-American writer. Apparently, he is currently a Bahai. “The Afrocentric Myth” was published when Salahuddin was a member of the “Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam”. The Ahmadis are a “heretical” Muslim group, or rather two groups. I assume Salahuddin supported the Lahore branch of the Ahmadiyya. The Ahmadis reject jihad, have a missionary outreach in the Western world, and are most known for the idea that Jesus survived the crucifixion and is buried in India.

The author is opposed to Black nationalism, and wants Black Americans to embrace Islam. In the process, he attempts to claim both Martin Luther King and Malcolm X. He also quotes extensively from the website Race Traitor. The chief “race traitor”, Noel Ignatiev, has written a positive blurb to Salahuddin's book. I find this curious, since Ignatiev's main project is to “abolish the White race”, not combat Black nationalism. By contrast, Salahuddin is opposed to all racial thinking, and wants to abolish the concept of a Black “race” immediately. He seems insensitive to the fact that White racism breeds Black nationalism as a defensive counter-reaction, making it unlikely that its supporters will abandon it any time soon. Ignatiev is, of course, nuts, but on *this* particular issue he strikes me as more astute than the author.

A large part of this short book deals with purported arguments for Islam. Thus, Salahuddin claims that Muhammad is mentioned in old Zoroastrian, Jewish and Hindu prophecies. He also quotes the Koran, where a prophecy about a certain Ahmad is attributed to Jesus. Ahmad is apparently another name of Muhammad. Incidentally, this detail shows that Salahuddin was a Lahore Ahmadiyya. The more radical Qadiani branch claims that Jesus' prophecy refers to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the 19th century founder of the Ahmadiyya!

To be honest, I don't think “The Afrocentric Myth” is particularly interesting, so I will only give it two stars.

Strange tales about Kashmir

Per Beskow is a Swedish writer, whose most well known book (in Swedish) is titled “Fynd och fusk i Bibelns värld”. In it, Beskow takes on and exposes various modern “apocrypha” about Jesus, including the Aquarian Gospel of Jesus the Christ and Notovitch's Life of Issa. I suppose “Strange Tales about Jesus” is either an English translation of this little classic, or a similar book for the international market.

The book at this product page, “Jesus i Kashmir”, only exists in a Swedish version. It's a pity, because it's both short, concise and highly informative. Beskow analyzes and rejects the ideas about Jesus put forward by the Ahmadiyya, a reform movement within Islam. The Ahmadis claim that Jesus survived the crucifixion, travelled to India together with Mary and Thomas, and is buried at Srinagar in Kashmir. Ahmadiyya's founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed to have received this knowledge by direct divine revelation, but he and his followers have also attempted to prove their case by appeals to various documents and traditions. Beskow is highly critical of these sources.

“The Crucifixion – by an Eyewitness”, purportedly an authentic letter from an Essene brother written seven years after the trial of Jesus, was actually penned in 1849 by an anonymous German Freemason. It claims that Jesus only swooned at the cross. Nicolas Notovitch's “Life of Issa” is a 19th century forgery. Besides, it doesn't claim that Jesus died in India. It claims rather that he spent his “missing years” there. The Ahmadiyya's main claim is that a certain Yuz Asaf is buried at Srinagar, and that he is Jesus. Beskow demonstrates that the association between Yuz Asaf and Kashmir can't be older than the 8th century, and that the specific connection to a certain tomb at Srinagar is from 1770 or 1780. Besides, Yuz Asaf isn't Jesus but Josaphat from the legend of Barlaam and Josaphat. That would make Yuz Asaf a character based on the Buddha, not on Jesus. Some documents pointed to by the Ahmadiyya are downright suspect, such as a manuscript by one Mulla Nadiri and an otherwise unknown special edition of the Hindu scripture Bhavishya Purana, in which Jesus is referred to as “Yusashaphat” and placed near Srinagar…

I believe Per Beskow has conclusively demonstrated that the story of Jesus' travel to India after the crucifixion is a modern invention. Of course, there is one huge problem with all of Beskow's books. He never takes on the *ultimate* legend of Jesus. I believe it's called “the New Testament”. Perhaps that's because the author is…a Catholic.

British Islam unveiled

"Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent" is an overview of the Muslim scene in Britain, written by a BBC reporter. The book is very easy to read, and hence suitable for the general reader. My only problem with it is that it sometimes reads more like a catalogue or directory, than an actual book. The book is refreshingly objective, and stays clear from the usual Islamophobia-Islamophilia conflict. But yes, it does raise some disturbing questions.

The main Muslim groups in Britain are the Deobandis and the Barelwis, two Sunni groups dominated by East Indians. The Deobandis control 44% of all British mosques, while the Barelwis control 25%. In terms of "mosque capacity", both groups are about equal.

The Deobandis are purist and "scriptural", and are often confused with Salafis (Wahhabites). The Taliban in Afghanistan are a militant offshoot of the Deobandi movement. Most Deobandis in Britain are apolitical, strongly conservative, patriarchal and separatist. Their goal is to live apart from mainstream society in Muslim enclaves. The Deobandi missionary movement is known as the Tablighi Jamaat. Its main purpose is to strengthen the faith of Muslims, rather than winning new converts. Occasionally, Deobandis have made forays into politics, either through the Labour Party or the Respect Party. Deobandi events are sometimes infiltrated by jihadists, who seek to politicize Deobandis who are disaffected by the "passivity" of their elders. The main problem (at least if you believe in a secular or fairly homogenous society) with the Deobandis, however, is their previously mentioned refusal to assimilate or even integrate into wider British society. The ultra-conservative attitude of the Deobandis (which sometimes make even Salafis look slightly subversive!) should be a concern for liberals and leftists, too.

The book reveals that the more political groups actually represent tiny minorities of the Muslim population in Britain. Inevitably, however, these are the very people British politicians or activists usually deal with. The Jamaat-e-Islami only controls 3% of British mosques, but the Jamaat-dominated Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) was nevertheless considered a quasi-official representative of the Muslim community by the British government! The Jamaat-e-Islami is an Islamist political party active in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In the aftermath of the 2005 London bombings, the MCB and their affiliates came under closer scrutiny, and it was revealed that their "moderate" and "assimilated" image was mostly for show. The British government more or less disowned the MCB after its refusal to break with Hamas. A leader of the MCB had signed a declaration supporting armed attacks against any naval forces aiding Israel. This was viewed as a veiled threat to attack British ships, since Prime Minister Gordon Brown had promised to aid Israel's blockade of arms shipments to Gaza. After the MCB fiasco, the British authorities began to promote a Barelwi-dominated and more apolitical Sufi council instead.

Another influential player is the Muslim Brotherhood, which only controls 0.4% of British mosques (seven in total). Of course, the Brotherhood is one of the strongest opposition movements in the Middle East, so in one sense their influence in Britain is understandable. The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) is a Brotherhood front which cultivates good relations with British governments. The only exception to the rule came during the initial phase of the Iraqi war, when the MAB joined the anti-war protests in London and entered an alliance with the Socialist Workers' Party and similar groups on the left. MAB also expressed strong support for the Palestinians (Hamas describes itself as a section of the Muslim Brotherhood). The Brotherhood's strength among Muslim students and exiled activists probably explains their appeal to British leftists. After an internal faction fight, the more radical activists left MAB, which then managed to repair its relations with the establishment. (Note that the Western powers flirt with the Brotherhood in Syria and perhaps Libya, and for a while also in Egypt.)

The Salafis (they don't like being called Wahhabites) are also relatively small in Britain, controlling only about 6% of the mosques. They are split in several different factions, some emphasizing Muslim piety and clean living, while others are jihadist. The book shows that returned veterans from the Afghan war against the Soviets played an important role in the emergence of a jihadist milieu in the West during the 1990's. The Muslim war against the secular-Communist regime in Kabul was, of course, backed (and funded) by the United States, with British support. The ease with which the Afghan veterans turned against the hands that fed them shows that they had their own (anti-Western) agendas all along.

The chapter on the Twelver Shia milieu is interesting. According to the author, most Shia in Britain don't follow Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei, but a more moderate faction around Grand Ayatollah Sistani based in the Iraqi city of Najaf. Sistani, while conservative, believes that a theocracy will only be established at the end of time, when the "Hidden Imam" reveals himself. Khamenei, of course, follows Khomeini, the original leader of the Islamic revolution in Iran, who argued for a worldly theocracy here and now. This confirms my suspicion that Khomeini turned originally quietist Shia Islam into a revolutionary movement. Another more moderate Shia group active in Britain is the Dawa Party, the dominant political organization in post-Saddam Iraq. The British government, for obvious reasons, prefer Sistani and Dawa to the Khamenei supporters. Yet, there seems to be a certain overlap between the various factions. Many Iranians are said to follow Sistani as a spiritual leader, while still supporting Khamenei's Islamic regime. The Dawa Party in Iraq, especially former prime minister Al-Maliki, has been accused of receiving support from Iran.

One of the more curious groups mentioned in the book are the Nizari Ismailis, who are pro-British, modernist and fairly liberal. Their leader the Aga Khan is a high society socialite, and one of his rare interviews were given to the magazine Vanity Fair! The Nizaris, most of whom are Indians, are also one of the smallest Muslim groups, both in Britain and internationally. Another pro-British group, albeit of a more conservative bent, is the Ahmadiyya. They are not mentioned in the book, however, due to their insignificant size. In Britain, the Ahmadis are mostly known for selling poppies at Remembrance Day.

Interestingly, I got to know about "Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent" after reading a positive review at the AWL website. The AWL is one of the few British leftist groups which supports Israel and oppose Islamism (except, ahem, during the war in Afghanistan, when they sided with the Islamists against the "Stalinist" Russians, which they apparently hated even more). The political positions of author Innes Bowen are less clear, but the book is sufficiently objective to make the reader draw his or her own conclusions...

It seems Islam in Britain has finally been unveiled. Pun intended!