Okej, det här var ju nästan lite intressant. En dimension av världshistorien jag helt har missat! Var tvungen att kolla upp vad i allsin dar "dzungarer" är för något. Observera förresten att Frans II Rákóczy enligt diverse skrönor var far till den mystiske greven av Saint Germain...
Once, I asked a White supremacist (?) on YouTube if Albanians are White. He denied it.
The picture above shows the Albanian national hero, the Catholic crusader Skanderbeg. Looks White to me...
The Alevis are a religious minority group in the Middle East, mostly in Turkey. This video (made by a US scholar of religion) is an excellent introduction to Alevism. Or perhaps ethnic Turkish Alevism? Kurdish and Zaza versions also exist.
The Alevis turn out to be a broad religious landscape rather than a specific movement or faith group. They could be described as a heterogenous cluster of nominally Sunni Muslim groups heavily influenced by Shia Islam and Sufi mysticism (which probably strides the Sunni-Shia divide). There are connections to the Bektashi Order and the Kizilbash rebel movement. Conversely, there are no overt connections to the Alawites (except the name), a radical Shia sect mostly based in Syria.
Alevis have continued to redefine their identities throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. They have also been redefined by outsiders. The claim that Alevism is really a primordial form of Shamanism turns out to come from Turkish secular nationalist discourse! Some Alevis emphasize their Muslim identity, while others ("Alevis without Ali") claim to be a separate community altogether and have even been condemned by Turkish president Erdogan himself as dangerous splitters.
As already indicated, Kurdish Alevism is only mentioned in passing and the Zaza version not at all. Years ago, I met a certain person who told me that the Zaza Alevis have a legend according to which they killed Kemal Atatürk somewhere in Kirmanjiye (in reality, Kemal died of natural causes at Istanbul). Maybe next time, bro?
Recommended. Actually!
John Michael Greer´s readers seem to be history nerds, since they wanted him to expand on an off-the-cuff comment he made a few years ago on the strength of the Ottoman Empire during the early 16th century! Ooookay. Not Richard Wagner, then? So here we go. I also asked ChatGPT to comment on some of the points raised in JMG´s essay (see long chunk of text below the link). Good luck!
A case study in stimulus diffusion
Can you compare the size and strength (military, economic, political) of the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire during the early 16th century?
Certainly. During the early 16th century—roughly from 1500 to 1550—the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire were two of the most powerful and expansive states in Europe and the Mediterranean. Here's a comparative overview across military, economic, political, and territorial dimensions:
Standing Army: Included the elite Janissaries, one of the earliest modern standing armies in Europe.
Navy: Dominant in the eastern Mediterranean. Admiral Hayreddin Barbarossa secured naval supremacy over much of the Mediterranean in the 1530s and 1540s.
Victories: Major success at the Battle of Mohács (1526), defeating Hungary and opening Central Europe to Ottoman expansion.
Tactics & Organization: Advanced logistics, use of firearms, and effective command structure.
Military Composition: Relied heavily on levies, mercenaries (like the German Landsknechts), and feudal contingents.
Navy: Weaker than the Ottomans in the Mediterranean; more focus on land power, especially in Europe.
Conflicts: Engaged in the Italian Wars and a long-running struggle against the Ottomans in Hungary and along the Austrian frontier.
Verdict: The Ottoman military was stronger, especially in terms of organization, professionalization, and naval power during this period.
Controlled vital trade routes between Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Cities like Istanbul, Cairo, and Aleppo were major economic centers.
Agricultural base was strong, supported by a complex timar system (land grants in exchange for military service).
Taxation and plunder from newly conquered territories (e.g., Mamluk lands, Hungary) boosted revenues.
Wealth came from Spain’s American colonies (after Charles V inherited the Spanish crown in 1516), but massive silver imports only became substantial in the late 16th century.
Controlled rich regions like Flanders, parts of Italy, and the Rhineland, with developed economies.
Faced chronic financial problems due to continuous warfare and reliance on borrowing.
Verdict: Roughly balanced, with the Ottomans having a broader internal economic base and the Habsburgs increasingly dependent on colonial wealth (which had not yet peaked in the early 16th century).
Highly centralized under the Sultan (e.g., Suleiman the Magnificent), with a unified administrative and legal system.
Bureaucracy was efficient and backed by the devshirme system (recruitment of Christian boys for state service).
Political stability was relatively high during Suleiman’s reign.
A dynastic conglomerate, especially under Charles V, who ruled over Spain, the Holy Roman Empire, the Netherlands, and parts of Italy.
Power was fragmented; Charles had to contend with independent princes in the Holy Roman Empire, and frequent revolts.
Bureaucratic cohesion was weaker due to the diversity of territories.
Verdict: The Ottomans had a more unified and centralized political system; the Habsburgs had greater breadth but less cohesion.
Controlled the Balkans, Anatolia, the Levant, Egypt, parts of North Africa, and by mid-century, large parts of Hungary.
Expansion continued into Central Europe and the Mediterranean.
Ruled over Spain, the Low Countries, parts of Italy (Naples, Milan), Austria, and were Holy Roman Emperors.
Charles V also inherited the Americas and began overseas expansion.
Verdict: Habsburgs had a wider global reach, but the Ottomans had more contiguous and manageable land-based territories with stronger regional dominance.
| Category | Ottoman Empire | Habsburg Empire |
|---|---|---|
| Military | Superior, especially on land/sea | Strong but fragmented |
| Economic | Strong internal base, trade routes | Wealth growing from colonies |
| Political | Centralized, unified rule | Dispersed, dynastic patchwork |
| Territory | Large, contiguous empire | Wider but fragmented & global |
Conclusion:
In the early 16th century, the Ottoman Empire was stronger militarily and more cohesive politically, with significant regional dominance in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. The Habsburg Empire, while vast and rising in global influence (especially under Charles V), was more challenged by internal fragmentation and financial strain. However, their colonial wealth and dynastic reach laid the foundation for long-term power.
Would you like a map comparison of their territories around 1520–1550?
From 1550 to 1600, the balance of power between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg Empire shifted in subtle and complex ways. While both remained major powers, their relative strength evolved, especially as the Habsburgs consolidated overseas wealth and the Ottomans began to face more internal and external challenges.
Still formidable, but signs of military overextension began to appear.
Fought the Long Turkish War (1593–1606) against the Habsburgs, which drained resources.
Navy declined in dominance after the Battle of Lepanto (1571), a major defeat by the Holy League, led by Spain and Venice.
Continued to field strong land armies, especially in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean.
Military power grew, especially through Spanish forces and increased use of firearms and fortifications.
Spanish Habsburgs (Philip II) achieved naval supremacy with victory at Lepanto.
Infantry (Spanish tercios) became the gold standard of early modern warfare.
More professionalized and disciplined armies compared to earlier decades.
Verdict: The Habsburgs became militarily stronger, particularly at sea and in Western Europe, though the Ottomans remained powerful on land in the East.
Still wealthy, but began to feel strain from continuous warfare, especially against Persia and the Habsburgs.
Inflation (due to influx of New World silver into global markets) destabilized the economy.
Some decline in the efficiency of tax collection and the timar system.
Enormous influx of silver from the Americas, especially from Potosí and Mexico.
Still faced serious debt and financial mismanagement (Philip II declared bankruptcy several times).
The Spanish economy was overstretched, particularly due to military commitments in the Netherlands, Italy, and against England.
Verdict: The Habsburgs had more wealth, but it was unevenly managed and tied up in military expenditures. The Ottomans had a more sustainable economy early on, but began to falter by century’s end.
Suleiman the Magnificent died in 1566; successors (Selim II, Murad III) were competent but not of Suleiman's caliber.
Power gradually shifted to the imperial court, viziers, and the harem (the so-called "Sultanate of Women").
Signs of bureaucratic decay and court intrigue emerged.
Philip II of Spain (r. 1556–1598) centralized power significantly in Spain.
However, faced major challenges:
The Dutch Revolt (1568–1648).
The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 by England.
Ongoing wars in Italy and the Mediterranean.
Verdict: Both empires faced growing internal pressures, but the Ottomans remained relatively more stable internally; the Habsburgs were increasingly challenged by rebellion and overstretch.
Continued expanding in Eastern Europe, North Africa, and against Persia.
Held a dominant position in the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Levant.
Less active in the Atlantic or global trade.
Spain (under Philip II) was the dominant global empire, with vast territories in the Americas, the Philippines, and major European possessions.
Controlled Portugal and its empire from 1580 to 1640, adding Brazil, Africa, and Asian trade routes.
Verdict: The Habsburgs (especially the Spanish branch) had far greater global reach and influence, while the Ottomans remained a regional superpower.
| Category | Ottoman Empire | Habsburg Empire |
|---|---|---|
| Military | Strong on land, declined at sea (post-1571) | Strengthened army/navy, more modern military |
| Economic | Still strong, but weakening | Wealthy from colonies, but in chronic debt |
| Political | Centralized but facing internal decay | Increasing centralization, but rebellion-ridden |
| Global Power | Dominant in the Eastern Med/Middle East | Dominant globally, especially after 1580 |
In the second half of the 16th century, the Habsburgs (especially Spain under Philip II) surpassed the Ottomans in military modernization, global reach, and economic wealth (despite financial strains). The Ottoman Empire remained strong, but its relative power plateaued, while early signs of internal strain and imperial overreach began to show.
Overall, the Habsburgs were stronger globally, while the Ottomans were still formidable regionally, especially in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean.
Would you like a timeline or map showing key developments between 1550 and 1600?
The idea that Protestant reformers were directly inspired by Islam is mostly a modern hypothesis, not something strongly supported by direct evidence from the time. However, there are some indirect connections, parallels, and contextual interactions that have led scholars to explore the idea more seriously in recent decades. Here's a breakdown:
There is no conclusive primary-source evidence that major Protestant reformers like Martin Luther, John Calvin, or Ulrich Zwingli were intentionally inspired by Islamic theology or political models in shaping their religious views. The core doctrinal reforms—like sola scriptura (scripture alone), sola fide (faith alone), and rejection of papal authority—came from internal critiques of Catholic theology and practice, not from Islamic sources.
Martin Luther wrote extensively about the Ottomans, especially during the 1520s and 1530s, when the Ottomans were threatening Central Europe.
He viewed Islam as a scourge sent by God to punish Christian corruption, but also criticized Catholic militarism against the Ottomans, saying that the Turks should be resisted not as “infidels” but as unjust aggressors—hinting at a more rational political theology.
Some scholars argue that his view of Islam as a monotheistic religion with strong legal and political unity made him rethink the relationship between church and state—but this influence is highly indirect.
Some European intellectuals and reformers used Islam as a negative foil to critique the Catholic Church—e.g., comparing papal power to that of the Sultan or calling the papacy “Antichrist” in ways that echoed critiques of Islamic despotism.
Islam’s rejection of icons, strong emphasis on scripture, and unity between law and religion sometimes invited comparisons with Reformed Protestantism, especially in Zwinglian or Calvinist circles.
However, these comparisons were more polemical or rhetorical, not clear indicators of theological borrowing.
Recent historians and political theorists have speculated on structural or philosophical parallels:
Max Weber and others noted similarities between Islamic legalism and Calvinist discipline, though not in terms of influence.
Some scholars explore how the presence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe created a geopolitical alternative to Christendom, potentially empowering Protestants by weakening the ideological monopoly of the Catholic Church.
In the 20th and 21st centuries, some have suggested that Protestant views on iconoclasm, anti-clericalism, or the unity of law and faith might have parallels in Islam, but again, this is analogical, not documentary evidence of influence.
For genuine intellectual influence to occur, there must be a mechanism of transmission—translations, discussions, shared texts, correspondence, etc. In the early 16th century:
Islamic theology was not widely available in Europe in translation.
Most knowledge of Islam came from polemic, hearsay, or travelers' accounts, not scholarly exchange.
Arabic and Islamic legal or philosophical texts were mostly confined to Spain and southern Italy and were studied by Catholics, not Protestants, at this time.
Direct inspiration? No strong evidence.
Indirect influence or parallel development? Plausible in some rhetorical, political, and structural ways.
Modern scholarly hypothesis? Yes—mainly in the form of comparative historical analysis, not documentary proof of inspiration.
So, while it's intellectually stimulating to explore Islam as a contextual factor or mirror for the Reformation, it's not historically accurate to say that Protestant reformers were inspired by Islam in any direct, substantive sense.
Would you like a list of modern scholars who explore these comparative angles in more detail?
Heh heh heh....
Yes—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had a complex and likely covert relationship with Freemasonry, and while not officially confirmed as a Freemason, a significant number of his closest allies were Masons, and many early reforms of the Turkish Republic reflected Masonic values. Turkish Freemasonry, especially in the late Ottoman and early Republican period, had strong political and symbolic associations with modernization, secularism, and nationalism—a profile that aligns very closely with Atatürk’s revolutionary ideology.
Initiation possibly occurred in the Macedonia Risorta Lodge in Salonika (Thessaloniki) before World War I.
Salonika was then a hotbed of Young Turk revolutionary activity, and many lodges were closely associated with the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which Atatürk supported.
Many of Atatürk's inner circle—such as Ismet İnönü, Fevzi Çakmak, and Dr. Rıza Nur—were confirmed Freemasons.
Masonic lodges were perceived as liberal and anti-absolutist, consistent with Atatürk’s anti-Sultan stance.
No surviving official initiation records of Atatürk.
Later in life, Atatürk tolerated the suspension of Masonic activity in the 1930s when it was seen as too independent from the state.
Some Masonic sources (especially conservative or Islamic critics) have exaggerated or demonized his connection for ideological reasons.
Most historians believe Atatürk was either a member or closely affiliated with Freemasonry, especially in the pre-republican revolutionary phase.
Freemasonry in the Ottoman Empire was introduced by European lodges (French, Italian, and British) in the 18th–19th centuries.
Lodges were multi-ethnic and multilingual, involving Turks, Greeks, Jews, and Armenians.
Masonic lodges, particularly in Salonika, Istanbul, and Izmir, became centers for:
Young Turk political activity
Discussions of constitutionalism
National reform and secularization
Possibly Atatürk’s lodge.
Linked to Italian Grand Orient Masonry.
Aimed at overthrowing the Sultan, promoting constitutional monarchy, and encouraging secular reform.
Rituals in this lodge likely followed the French or Italian-style Grand Orient rite, which emphasizes:
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity
Anti-dogmatism
Symbolic interpretation of Enlightenment ideals
The current Grand Lodge of Turkey practices Scottish Rite degrees (up to 33°), and rituals are in Turkish.
Includes:
Traditional Blue Lodge degrees (Entered Apprentice, Fellow Craft, Master Mason)
Higher degrees emphasizing philosophy, history, morality, and national themes
Rituals avoid overt religious references, reflecting Atatürk’s secularism.
| Theme | Ritual Emphasis |
|---|---|
| Enlightenment | Allegories of light vs darkness, learning vs ignorance |
| National Unity | Focus on rebuilding society, echoes of ancient Turkish identity |
| Secularism | Ethical focus, not theological; rejection of clerical dogma |
| Moral Renewal | Individual improvement as foundation for societal progress |
| Resistance to Tyranny | Common in political rituals pre-1908 revolution |
Some lodges may have used modified versions of European rituals—especially French Grand Orient rituals—which had strong secular, humanist symbolism and often omitted references to a Supreme Being (a controversial point in Masonry worldwide).
In the 1930s, some Masonic lodges in Turkey were closed or pressured to disband, officially due to “foreign influence” or “subversive independence.”
However, the core values of Masonry were already embedded in state ideology:
Education reform
Calendar and alphabet reform
Civil law replacing Sharia
Separation of mosque and state
💬 In essence, Atatürk “nationalized” many of the Masonic Enlightenment ideals into the structure of the new Turkish Republic.
| Aspect | Influence |
|---|---|
| Personal initiation | Probable, but unconfirmed (Salonika) |
| Allies and environment | Surrounded by Masons, especially in CUP |
| Ideological alignment | Deeply aligned: secularism, nationalism, reform |
| Rituals | Based on liberal, Enlightenment rites; often European (Grand Orient) |
| Legacy | Masonic ideals embedded into Kemalist republicanism |
Would you like a sample of one of the actual Turkish Masonic rituals, such as the opening of a lodge or a degree description, as used in that era?
 |
| - Ingen jävel kommer igenom Uralbergen! |
Det blir *lite* konstigt när Tobias Hübinette - av alla människor - plötsligt börjar låta som en "problematisk" vit supremacist som varnar för "den gula faran", osmaner och pirater från Nordafrika...
Sedan undrar jag om det verkligen är bekräftat att Nordkorea skickat 10,000 stridande soldater till Ukraina? En mängd olika siffror (från 1,500 till 12,000) cirkulerar. Det ligger dock i linje med den ryska inriktningen att mestadels skicka legoknektar och kanonmat till fronten, snarare än reguljära ryska förband.
Med risk för att låta cynisk så får vi väl hoppas att nordkoreanerna är kanonmaten.
Den första asiatiska truppnärvaron i Europa sedan mongolernas invasioner på 1200-talet
I kind of like Hungary´s new EU slogan "Make Europe great again". What a pity it comes from a people historically allied with the Ottoman Empire...
:D
 |
| Credit: Meganesia |
Thus, Karlsson points out that Monophysite Christians played a leading intellectual
role in the medieval Muslim world, collecting ancient Greek or Roman
manuscripts, and then translating them into Semitic languages. In the “multi-culturalist”
pro-Muslim propaganda, this is often credited to the Muslims themselves. The Catholic crusader states were multi-ethnic
and multi-religious (except for the city of Jerusalem, where only Christians
were allowed to live). Medieval Muslim historians considered the crusades to be
a minor nuisance, instead viewing the Mongols as the larger threat. When a
German emperor during the 19th century wanted to pay homage to
Saladin, it took considerable time to locate the tomb of the legendary Muslim
leader, since it had been almost forgotten! Muslim obsession with the crusades
is mostly a 20th century phenomenon, a kind of counterpoint to the
*modern* Western encroachments on the Middle East (and, of course, Israel). It
works in tandem with Western obsessions about the same thing, positive or
negative. The roots of the present situation in the Middle East are in any case
to be found in the aftermath of World War I, and has nothing to do with the Middle
Ages.
Karlsson does consider the Turkish/Kurdish massacres of the Armenians to
have been a genocide, but also points out that the Armenians supported Russia
during World War I (which technically made them traitors, since the Ottoman
Empire was allied with Germany), that Armenian terrorist groups existed long before
the genocide, and that they often targeted Kurdish civilians. One Armenian group
even massacred Kurds in the hope that they would retaliate and the ensuing
chaos provoke a British intervention (which never materialized). The Turks are
often cast as evil oppressors by liberals and leftists in the West, but were
just as often on the receiving end of violence and ethnic cleansing, for
instance in Greece and Bulgaria during the 19th century Balkan wars.
The Greeks began their liberation struggle against the Ottoman Empire by large
scale massacres of Turks in the Peloponnese. I get the impression that Karlsson
has a (perhaps involuntary) admiration for Kemal Atatürk, the authoritarian Turkish
nationalist who managed to stop the dismemberment of Turkey in the aftermath of
World War I.
More recent alliances in the region are often extremely confusing. Thus,
the pro-Israeli South Lebanese Army (SLA) during the Lebanese civil war was led
by an Eastern Catholic and mostly consisted of Shia Muslims?! The Armenian Churches
outside Armenia are part-Arab, since affiliating with these Churches gives you
a higher social standing. In Iraq, about half of the Christians belong to a
Shia-dominated pro-Iranian coalition. The Iraqi gentleman who spent most of
last year burning Qurans in Sweden have a background in this milieu. One thing
not mentioned in the book are the weird alliances of the Druze, a peculiar
minority religion found in both Israel, Syria and Lebanon. Maybe the next
edition can fill us in?
The most controversial chapter is probably the last one, in which
Karlsson makes negative comments about the “Assyrian” immigration to Sweden
from Syria during the 1970´s and 1980´s. He wonders why nobody was surprised
about the fact that a people who disappeared from history 2,600 years ago
suddenly re-appeared…in the Swedish town of Södertälje! Most of the “Assyrians”
were members of the Syriac Orthodox Church and hence didn´t identify as Assyrian.
Mass immigration of Syriac Orthodox from Syria to Sweden mainly took place from
the Qamishly district, where no Syriac were persecuted by the Assad regime,
many of the regional officials and officers were Syriac, and a Syriac church
stood next to the building of the secret police. One of the first persons from
Qamishly to get political asylum in Sweden as a refugee was a local boss of the
ruling Baath party! Many of the “refugees” regularly returned to Qamishly (even
greeting the Swedish “refugee coordinator”), forged and strangely uniform documents
proving “persecution” were legion, one of the “banned Assyrian organizations”
was actually legal and complained about the exodus, and so on. Delegations of “refugees”
often visited Syria in order to construct new “native languages” which were
then taught in Swedish schools (at the tax-payers expense) to Syriac children. The
Syriac Christians referred to Sweden as “Ammo Djebbo”, a naïve and stupid
character who tries to become popular by giving everyone money, while people
laugh behind his back…
Karlsson claims that the political parties in Sweden each had their own
favorite refugee/immigrant group during the 1970´s and 1980´s. The Social Democrats
promoted Latin Americans, the Left Party the Kurds, the Center Party the West
Saharans (!), the Conservatives anti-Communists from the Soviet bloc, and the Liberal
Party “Christians from the Middle East” – actually, mostly the Syriac Orthodox.
However, at the end of the book, it becomes obvious that Karlsson doesn´t really
oppose immigration. *Today* the Christians in the Middle East are more
persecuted than ever (he blames one George W Bush for this), and presumably
wants the Western world to give them asylum. Instead, Ammo Djebbo has suddenly
become jaded and cynical, and now doesn´t want to let anyone inside.
With that, I end this little review.
Ett kort blogginlägg signerat Tobias Hübinette om vad som (kanske) hänt om centralmakterna gått segrande ur första världskriget.
Jag antar att den liberala demokratins genombrott (och sammanbrott) skjutits upp med kanske 50 år.
That´s it. That´s the scenario.
På en punkt har Hübinette faktiskt fel: Ukraina fick inte sina nuvarande gränser förrän efter *andra* världskriget (eller ännu senare om man räknar med Krim).
Inte helt glasklart vad Hübinette vill säga oss här, kanske är det bara en märklig faktoid...
Världens första regnbågsfamilj skapades av stenrik jude från Bagdad bosatt i Shanghai
