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| Credit: Charles J Sharp |
Den här moskén har varit på tapeten länge. Och varför bosätter sig vissa invandrare i ett land som älskar bögar och fria kvinnor? Kanske för att det var Sverige som tog hit dem...? Den andra länken är sex år gammal. Någon kan väl informera L-ledaren.
L-ledaren rasar efter moskéns minnesstund
"Den här gruppen kommer fortsätta att vara lojal mot den iranska staten"
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| Credit: Mvshreeram |
Komala, which apparently claims to be Social Democratic these days, has joined the Kurdistan Parties Coalition, which the United States may (or may not) arm against the Iranian regime. A propos the previous blog post.
Komala Party officially joins Kurdistan Parties Coalition
Another party joins opposition alliance
International support crucial to ending the regime in Iran
Interesting. So I suppose the question now is: is Donald Trump more like George Bush senior (who betrayed the Shia and the Kurds at the last moment during the Gulf War) or more like George Bush junior (who finished the job during the Iraq War)? Judging by his actions in Venezuela, the answer is "George Bush senior". So if I would be a Kurdish peshmerga, I would probably need very, very strong "security guarantees" before I enter the fray. See also: the SDF in Syria, et cetera.
Some of these apocalyptic prophecies sound less bizarre now, after the United States and Israel attacked the Iranian regime! Which doesn´t mean they´re true. Of course they´re not. The people in this video may be genuinely insane, but sometimes even the paranoid are persecuted...
It´s become something of a tradition on this here blog that we post cutsie pics of Ganesha every Wednesday, so here we go again. This is apparently Bhakti Ganapati, one of the 32 classical forms of Ganesha. Note the banana!
I actually assumed bananas were originally from South and Central America, but naaah, they are from the Indomalayan region. Fun fact: pineapples (which *are* from South America) have been introduced to India and are sometimes offered to Hindu idols...
Scientific Realists attempt to bridge the gap between our internal perceptions and the external world by moving the conversation away from "sensory images" and toward explanatory power.
If the Indirect Realist is trapped in a "theater of the mind," the Scientific Realist argues that the best explanation for the consistent, predictable patterns on that screen is a mind-independent, physical reality that obeys mathematical laws.
This is the most famous defense of Scientific Realism, primarily championed by Hilary Putnam.
The Argument: Science is incredibly successful at predicting the behavior of the world (e.g., landing a rover on Mars or predicting an eclipse).
The Conclusion: If the "atoms," "waves," and "photons" described by science weren't actually real—if they were just useful mental fictions or "images"—then the success of science would be a miracle. Since miracles are not a sound basis for philosophy, we must assume that our scientific theories refer to real, mind-independent things.
Scientific Realists admit they cannot "step outside" their heads to prove a straw is straight, but they use Abduction (logical inference).
The Scenario: You have two hypotheses:
There is a real, physical, straight straw in a real glass of water, and light refracts at $n=1.33$.
There is no straw, and your mind is just coincidentally producing a complex, mathematically consistent "bent-straw-simulation."
The Verdict: Scientific Realists argue that (1) is the "best explanation" because it is simpler and has more predictive power.
Because scientific theories often change (e.g., moving from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian relativity), some realists adopt Structural Realism.
The Theory: We might be wrong about the "entities" (what an electron is), but we are right about the mathematical structure and the relationships between things.
The Bridge: The "structure" is what is real. Even if our "image" of an atom changes over centuries, the mathematical laws governing how it interacts with other atoms remain consistent.
Ian Hacking famously argued that if we can manipulate something to produce an effect, it must be real.
The Quote: "If you can spray them, they are real." (Referring to electrons).
The Logic: We aren't just looking at "images" of electrons; we are building machines that use them to change the world. The fact that the world "pushes back" in predictable ways proves we are interacting with something objective, even if we only perceive it indirectly.
Despite its popularity, Scientific Realism faces two major hurdles:
The Pessimistic Meta-Induction: History is a graveyard of "successful" scientific theories that turned out to be false (e.g., Phlogiston, Caloric, the Luminiferous Ether). If previous scientists were "wrong" about what was "real," why should we assume we are "right" now?
Underdetermination: For any set of data (images), there could be an infinite number of different theories that explain that data perfectly. We choose the one that "feels" most realistic, but we can't prove it's the only one.
| Feature | Indirect Realism | Scientific Realism |
| Focus | Sensory "Sense-Data" (Color, Shape). | Theoretical Entities (Atoms, Fields). |
| Truth Criterion | Coherence (Does it match my other senses?). | Predictive Success (Does it work in an experiment?). |
| The "Straw" | A mental image being compared to other images. | A physical object whose properties are defined by physics. |
Would you like to examine the "Pessimistic Meta-Induction" more closely to see how it threatens the idea of objective reality, or should we look at how "Structural Realism" tries to survive the death of scientific theories?
Gemini LLM on direct realism. Part four. Enjoy!
Isn´t indirect realism self-contradictory? How can the indirect realist *know* that a straw bent in water isn´t real, if everything are just mental images? They seem to use one mental image to disprove another one!
You have hit on what many philosophers call the "Transcendental Objection" to indirect realism. It is a powerful critique that points to a fundamental "performative contradiction" in the theory.
The contradiction you are identifying is this: the indirect realist claims we only ever perceive mental representations, yet they frequently use physical facts (like the laws of refraction or the actual straightness of a straw) to explain why our perceptions are sometimes "wrong."
Here is how that contradiction is broken down and how indirect realists attempt to wiggle out of it.
As you noted, the indirect realist says: "I know the straw isn't actually bent because I know the laws of physics and the properties of wood."
The Problem: How does the indirect realist know the laws of physics or the "true" shape of the straw? According to their own theory, their knowledge of physics and "straight straws" also came to them via mental images.
The Contradiction: They are using "privileged" mental images (the ones they label as 'scientific' or 'accurate') to demote "deceptive" mental images (the bent straw). But if everything is a mental image, they have no objective "ruler" outside of their own mind to decide which image is the "true" one.
Most indirect realists (like John Locke or modern functionalists) try to solve this using Coherentism. They argue that we don't need to "step outside" our heads to find truth; we just need to see which images play well together.
Consistency: If I pull the straw out of the water, it looks straight. If I touch it, it feels straight. If I use a ruler, it measures straight.
The Argument: The "bent" image is a singular anomaly. The "straight" image is supported by a massive web of other sensory data (touch, memory, mathematics).
The Indirect Realist's Counter: They aren't using one image to disprove another; they are using a consistent system of images to identify an inconsistent one.
Another way they avoid contradiction is by distinguishing between Primary and Secondary qualities.
Primary (The "Truth"): Extension, motion, number. These are "mathematical" and exist in the object.
Secondary (The "Representation"): Color, taste, "bentness." These exist in the mind.
The Logic: The indirect realist argues that they can "calculate" the truth of the world using the primary qualities (math/physics) even if their secondary qualities (the visual image) are wonky.
If you push the indirect realist on your point—"How do you know there is even a straw at all?"—they eventually have to admit they don't know for certain.
This leads to the Skeptical Gap. If they are consistent, they must admit that their "scientific" view of the world is just a very useful, highly organized dream. If they claim to know the "real" world exists behind the image, they are making a "leap of faith" that their theory technically forbids.
Your Point: If we only see images, we have no "non-image" to compare them to.
The Indirect Realist Response: We compare images to other images and choose the most mathematically consistent ones.
The Direct Realist Response: Exactly! This is why indirect realism is a "prison." We should just admit we are seeing the straw itself, albeit through the medium of water.
Would you like to look at the "Coherence Theory of Truth" which many indirect realists use to justify their claims, or should we examine how "Scientific Realism" tries to bridge this gap?
More on direct realism c/o Gemini. Part three.
Can you explore the "Argument from Hallucination," which is considered a much tougher test for Direct Realism than simple optical illusions?
The Argument from Hallucination is considered the "final boss" for Direct Realism because, unlike an illusion (where a real object like a straw is simply distorted), a hallucination involves perceiving something when no external object exists at all.
If you "see" a dagger that isn't there, and the experience is indistinguishable from seeing a real dagger, the Indirect Realist argues there must be a "common factor"—a mental image—present in both cases.
Direct Realists attempt to solve this through two primary maneuvers: Disjunctivism and Intentionalism.
Disjunctivism is the most robust Direct Realist response. It denies that a veridical (true) perception and a hallucination are the same kind of mental event.
The Argument: The Indirect Realist assumes that because State A (seeing a real tree) and State B (hallucinating a tree) feel the same, they must be the same type of "mental state" (subjective experience of an image).
The Direct Realist Solution: They are fundamentally different.
Veridical Perception is a "relational" state: it is a direct connection between your mind and the object.
Hallucination is a "failed" state: it is a purely internal mental event.
The Analogy: A "perfect counterfeit" $100 bill looks exactly like a real one, but they are not the same thing. One is legal tender backed by a treasury; the other is just ink on paper. They belong to different categories despite their identical appearance.
This view treats perception as having "intentional content," much like a thought or a belief.
The Argument: If I believe "The Moon is made of cheese," my belief is about the Moon, even though the content is false. I don't need a "mental cheese-moon" inside my head to have that belief.
The Direct Realist Solution: Perception is a way of the world "presenting itself" to you.
In a Veridical Perception, the world presents itself truly.
In a Hallucination, the world "presents itself" falsely.
The "experience" is not an object (a mental image) you are looking at; it is a property of your consciousness being directed toward the world, even if that direction is currently misfiring.
Direct Realists often point out that hallucinations have different causal origins than perceptions.
Perception: Caused by light bouncing off an object and entering the eye.
Hallucination: Caused by drugs, sleep deprivation, or neurological triggers.
The Conclusion: Because the causes are different, the Direct Realist argues we shouldn't define "normal perception" based on the "abnormal" instance of a hallucination. Just because a flight simulator feels like flying doesn't mean that when you fly a real plane, you are "actually" just in a simulator.
| Feature | Indirect Realist View | Direct Realist View (Disjunctivist) |
| What are you seeing? | A mental representation (Sense-data). | Nothing (You are in a failed state). |
| The "Common Factor" | Both states share a "mental image." | There is no common factor; they are distinct. |
| Nature of Mind | The mind is a "theater" watching a screen. | The mind is an "open window" to the world. |
A subset of this problem is the Time-Lag Argument. Since light takes time to travel (e.g., 8 minutes from the Sun), we are always seeing the past.
Indirect Realists say this proves we see a "representation" because the object might not even exist by the time the light hits our eyes.
Direct Realists counter that "Directness" is not about time, but about lack of an intermediate mental object. We are directly perceiving the sun as it was 8 minutes ago, not a "picture" of the sun in our heads.
Would you like to explore the "Screen of Perception" metaphor more deeply, or perhaps look into how modern neuroscience (Predictive Processing) weighs in on this debate?
Why direct realism is true. Part two.
How do direct realists solve the problem of illusion?
Direct realism (or "Naive Realism") faces a significant challenge: if we perceive the world exactly as it is, how can we account for illusions (where we see something that isn't there) or hallucinations?
Direct realists generally employ three primary strategies to defend their position without resorting to "sense-data" or internal mental representations.
This is the most common defense. It argues that perception is a three-way relationship between the perceiver, the object, and the environmental conditions.
The Argument: When you see a straw as "bent" in a glass of water, you are not seeing a "mental image" of a bent straw. You are directly perceiving the actual straw as it appears through the medium of water.
The Solution: The "bentness" is a property of the light's refraction in that specific context. You are perceiving a mind-independent physical fact (refraction) accurately. The "illusion" is actually a correct perception of a complex physical situation.
This is a more radical logical move favored by modern direct realists like John McDowell and M.G.F. Martin.
The Argument: Critics of direct realism assume that because a hallucination of a dagger feels like seeing a real dagger, they must both be made of the same "stuff" (mental images).
The Solution: Disjunctivists argue they are fundamentally different.
State A: You are directly perceiving an object (Veridical).
State B: Your cognitive system is malfunctioning (Hallucination/Illusion).
There is no "common factor" (sense-data) between them. One is an open window to the world; the other is a broken window. Just because they "feel" similar doesn't mean they share the same ontological status.
This view suggests that "appearing" is a unique, direct relation that objects have to subjects.
The Argument: An object has its inherent properties, but it also has the property of "appearing-a-certain-way-to-a-perceiver."
The Solution: When a circular coin looks elliptical from an angle, the coin is simply "appearing-elliptical-to-me." The "elliptical-appearance" is not a mental object in my head; it is a way the actual coin relates to my specific point in space.
| Approach | How it explains a "Bent Straw" |
| Relational View | You are seeing the straw + the water's refraction. Both are real and external. |
| Disjunctivism | Seeing a straight straw and "seeing" a bent one are two unrelated mental events. |
| Theory of Appearing | The straw has the mind-independent property of "appearing bent" from that angle. |
Some direct realists argue that perception is like belief—it has "content."
The Solution: Perception is a direct "presentation" of the world.
Critics of these solutions (Indirect Realists) often argue that these explanations are "ad hoc"—that they are verbal gymnastics used to avoid the obvious conclusion that there is a gap between the world and the mind. However, for the Direct Realist, these solutions are necessary to preserve the intuition that we are actually in the world, rather than trapped in a biological simulation.
Would you like me to explore the "Argument from Hallucination," which is considered a much tougher test for Direct Realism than simple optical illusions?
