The "fantasy" of Eurafrica

“Eurafrica” by Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson is an English-language book written by two Swedish political scientists. The book has been translated back into Swedish, and I recently read the (apparently somewhat revised) Swedish version. The authors are left-wing and sound fairly radical. The main thesis of “Eurafrica” is that the European Union, and the entire pan-European idea, has colonialist roots, and hence isn't a “peace project” as depicted in the EU's official propaganda. The idea of European unity was intimately connected to, even driven by, colonialist-imperialist agendas. These were mostly directed towards Africa.

The idea of European political unity became popular during the interwar period, and was often connected to the geopolitical notion of Eurafrica. According to this theory, Africa is the natural hinterland (or “Lebensraum”, if you want to use a controversial term) of Europe. The European colonial powers should therefore cooperate rather than compete in Africa, and even Germany (which lost its colonies after World War I) should be invited to share the benefits. This would prevent a new world war and strengthen Europe against the United States. The Pan-European movements fell on hard times during World War II, but where revived afterwards. France in particular cherished the idea of a European political union geared towards Africa, especially during the war in Algeria, which France considered an integrated part of the motherland, due to the large number of French nationals residing there. Konrad Adenauer of West Germany was another strong Eurafricanist. Britain, by contrast, opted out of the Pan-European project (after a brief flirtation), opting instead for a closer alliance with the United States.

The reasoning behind the Eurafrica concept is fairly simple. Europe can get cheap raw materials and food from “the dark continent”, while also using it to establish settlements for European emigrants. This would make Europe less dependent on imports from the dollar zone, while relieving the continent of its surplus-population (Italy in particular was deemed to be overpopulated). An alliance between Europe, headed by France and West Germany, and the African colonies would act as a geopolitical counterweight to the United States and the Soviet Union, and hence as a “third force” in world politics. European politicians also feared “Bandung”, the non-aligned movement of Communist and nationalist regimes in the “Third World”, seeing Eurafrica as a chance for retrenchment when most of Asia had been lost for European colonialism. To use the language of geopolitics, Eurafrica was to become an alternative to Eurasia (and America).

There were also Cold War concerns, with France emphasizing that North Africa was needed as a fallback position in case a military offensive from the East (in this case, the Soviet Union rather than Germany!) would be successful. Defense of Europe started, or perhaps ended, in North Africa. Therefore, the Mediterranean had to become “Mare Nostrum”, with both shores controlled by European powers. These concerns weren't academic, as shown by the war in Algeria (where France had high hopes for finding oil and other important resources in the Sahara) and the Suez crisis, which speeded up the tempo of European integration. In a sense, Nasser was responsible for the EEC!

The European powers argued that Eurafrica would be good for the Africans, too, and the project was supported by pro-Western African politicians, uncritically by Félix Houphouët-Boigny (later president of the Ivory Coast) and more critically by Léopold Sédar Senghor (later president of Senegal). The authors argue that Eurafrica, in a sense, was successful since most African nations even after independence remained dependent on the EEC and their former colonial masters. At the same time, the EEC and its successor the EU began to whitewash (pun unintended!) its historical roots, claiming that European unity was above all a positive liberal project of French-British-German unity, born of revulsion towards wars and a longing for friendship among the peoples…

While I don't doubt that there is much truth in this book, I can't say I like the way the authors spin their own propaganda, with “the Whites” being “post-colonially deconstructed” as all evil. Perhaps somebody needs to remind Hansen and Jonsson that the massive African slave trade was introduced by the Muslims, taken over by Europe at a later date, *and even later abolished by the European powers against strong Muslim and local opposition*. The first abolitionists in Algeria were French Catholic missionaries! It's also rather strange that the authors call Eurafrica a “geopolitical fantasy”, when their entire book proves the exact opposite. The fact that the notion of a north-south geopolitical axis around the Mediterranean Sea constantly resurfaces in world history surely proves that it expresses something real. Witness the Roman Empire, the Muslim conquests in southern Europe, European conquests in North Africa, or Russian attempts to stop both Europe and the Muslims from turning the Mediterranean into an exclusive preserve. Where's the “fantasy”?

That being said, “Eurafrica” nevertheless was extremely interesting. I've encountered the geopolitical concept of Eurafrica before, without realizing it. Thus, post-Mao China's “Three Worlds Theory” incorporated a new version of Eurafrica in the idea that Western Europe must build stronger ties with anti-Soviet regimes in Africa and the Middle East. This explains the Maoist infatuation with French Gaullism, which (of course) already had such a strategy. A theme not explored in the book, but well worth pondering, is whether European Islamophilia and anti-Zionism is connected to Eurafrica? With North Africa independent, the only way to secure it for European interests is to woo the Muslims (or suitable Muslim factions), rather than launching new operations á la Suez 1956. The attempts by certain European circles to thaw relations with Gadaffi's Libya can also be interpreted as a Eurafricanist strategy under new conditions, since Libya itself had an Africanist strategy all its own, with Gadaffi longing for a Libyan hinterland (or Grossraum) in sub-Saharan Africa. If you can't beat him, join him?

A more cartoonish version of Eurafrica can be met in the lunatic ravings of one Lyndon LaRouche (complete with floating fusion reactors none-too-safely anchored in the Gulf of Guinea), who – perhaps uniquely – combines it with an Eurasianist strategy, too. LaRouche's high tech utopias are obviously stolen from the more optimistic writings of the interwar Pan-Europeanists, which may explain why he constantly attacks them! The old man wants to hide his sources, methinks.

In the end, I give this book four stars out of five.