ChatGPT on the current state of the Russian military, etc.
Can you comment the following claim: Russia hasn´t deployed its best troops in Ukraine, but are purposefully holding them back for a future confrontation with NATO. This explains why the casaulties on the Russian side is mostly untrained conscript troops ("cannon fodder") and various mercenary companies. Thus, Russia can both defeat Ukraine and threaten NATO at a later point.
This claim — that Russia is deliberately holding back its best troops for a future confrontation with NATO, using mostly low-quality forces in Ukraine — is an assertion that deserves careful scrutiny. Let's break it down and comment on its plausibility based on available evidence and strategic logic.
1. Has Russia deployed its best troops in Ukraine?
Reality:
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Yes, many of them. At the beginning of the invasion in February 2022, Russia did commit elite units, such as airborne (VDV), Spetsnaz, and tank divisions. Many of these units suffered significant losses in the early months of the war, particularly in battles near Kyiv, Kharkiv, and the Donbas.
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VDV and other elite forces have been heavily degraded — multiple analysts and Western intelligence sources confirm that these units were not only deployed, but also took disproportionate casualties. Some had to be rebuilt or replenished with less experienced troops.
2. Is Russia primarily using conscripts and mercenaries now?
Partially true, but misleading.
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Russia has increasingly relied on mobilized reservists, volunteer contract soldiers, prisoner recruits (Wagner Group), and regional militias — many of whom are poorly trained and equipped.
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However, by late 2023 and into 2024, Russia began reconstituting better-trained brigades, incorporating battle-hardened veterans, and professionalizing units as part of a longer war effort. So it’s not purely “cannon fodder” anymore.
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Wagner, for instance, was a key offensive force, especially in battles like Bakhmut. But after the 2023 Wagner mutiny and the death of Prigozhin, their role changed.
3. Is Russia holding back troops for a future war with NATO?
Highly speculative and strategically questionable.
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Russia’s ability to fight NATO directly is currently limited. The war in Ukraine has severely strained its conventional forces — equipment losses, manpower attrition, and sanctions-induced limitations on replenishment are all significant.
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If Russia were seriously preparing for war with NATO, it would be rebuilding high-readiness reserves, modernizing command and control, and deploying more troops to borders with NATO countries — but open-source data does not strongly support this narrative.
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Moreover, Russia’s doctrine assumes nuclear deterrence as its primary check against NATO, not conventional parity.
4. Can Russia “defeat” Ukraine while preserving strength for NATO confrontation?
Unlikely under current conditions.
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The Ukrainian military, heavily supported by Western intelligence, weapons, and logistics, has proven resilient. Even if Russia gains ground, it will be costly and slow, not a quick conquest.
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If Russia could “defeat” Ukraine easily with second-rate troops, it would already have done so. The fact that the war has dragged on for more than two years indicates that Russia has been forced to use more of its conventional capacity than it might have liked.
Conclusion:
The claim overstates Russia’s strategic flexibility and underestimates the toll the Ukraine war has taken on its military.
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Russia did use many elite troops and suffered for it.
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Its current force structure is a mix, but not mostly cannon fodder.
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The idea of “saving” elite forces for a NATO fight assumes a level of foresight and capability that doesn’t match how Russia has been forced to fight.
So, while there might be some element of strategic reserve in play (every major power does this to some extent), the core of the claim — that Russia has held back its best troops and is playing a long game for a NATO conflict — lacks solid support and appears more like strategic speculation or propaganda than a robust military analysis.
Exactly — that line of reasoning is crucial.
If Russia could have achieved a swift victory in Ukraine by deploying its best troops in a "shock and awe" blitzkrieg-style campaign, there are strong incentives to do so:
1. Political Objectives:
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Putin's original plan in February 2022 seems to have been a rapid decapitation of the Ukrainian government — a quick advance to Kyiv, the installation of a pro-Russian regime, and minimal resistance.
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A fast win would have minimized sanctions, preserved Russia’s conventional forces, and demonstrated power to both NATO and internal audiences.
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Instead, the failure to take Kyiv quickly turned the war into a prolonged, grinding campaign — something Russia almost certainly didn’t want or plan for initially.
2. Military Logic:
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Blitzkrieg works best with surprise, speed, and overwhelming force. Russia attempted this in 2022, but:
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Poor intelligence underestimated Ukrainian resistance.
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Logistical weaknesses undermined Russian armored thrusts.
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Coordination failures between air, armor, and infantry created bottlenecks.
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Elite units were committed and badly mauled, especially airborne and Spetsnaz troops in Hostomel and elsewhere.
So the war shifted to attrition not by choice, but by necessity.
3. War of Attrition: A Tactical Retreat in Strategy
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After the initial failure, Russia had to fall back on a deep reserves model, using mass mobilization and long-range fires (artillery, missiles, drones) to wear Ukraine down.
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This is not a high-efficiency strategy — it’s costly, slow, and politically risky (mobilizations stir dissent).
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But it’s what Russia has left. The alternative — rotating in unused elite troops — would only make sense if such troops existed in sufficient quantity and readiness, which seems doubtful.
4. Strategic Signaling:
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If Russia had held back elite units in meaningful numbers, NATO intelligence would likely detect this via satellite and electronic surveillance. Western planners have not indicated the presence of a large, unused elite strike force.
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What has been observed is efforts to rebuild units degraded in Ukraine, not whole elite armies waiting in the wings.
Bottom Line:
Russia tried and failed to win quickly. It did not voluntarily choose a war of attrition — it was forced into it by Ukrainian resistance and its own operational failures. The idea that Russia is holding back its “real army” for NATO is far more likely to be:
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Propaganda to intimidate,
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Wishful thinking by some analysts or commentators,
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Or a misreading of Russia’s actual force-generation capabilities.
If a blitzkrieg had been feasible, it would have been the logical and preferred path. The fact that we’ve seen the opposite speaks volumes.
North Korea has deployed a substantial military contingent to Russia's Kursk region, primarily consisting of elite special operations forces from the 11th Army Corps, also known as the "Storm Corps." This unit includes specialized brigades such as the 16th Sniper Brigade and the 43rd Mountain Infantry Sniper Brigade .thesun.co.uk+4longwarjournal.org+4reddit.com+4en.wikipedia.org
Composition and Deployment
Initial deployments began in late 2024, with approximately 12,000 troops sent to support Russian operations in Kursk . These forces were integrated into Russian units, often wearing Russian uniforms and carrying Russian military identification . Their roles included front-line infantry assaults, often accompanying Russian paratrooper companies .forbes.comlongwarjournal.org+1apnews.com+1kyivindependent.com
In early 2025, North Korea dispatched an additional 1,000 to 3,000 specialist troops to bolster their presence. These reinforcements included motorized infantry, sappers, and electronic intelligence units, aiming to enhance operational effectiveness in modern warfare environments .kyivpost.com
Tactical Evolution
Initially, North Korean forces employed large-scale, company-sized assaults, which resulted in significant casualties due to vulnerability to Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes . Recognizing these losses, tactics shifted to smaller, platoon-sized units to reduce detectability and improve maneuverability on the battlefield .
Casualties and Impact
The deployment has come at a high cost. Reports indicate that approximately one-third of the initial 12,000 troops have been killed or wounded . Despite these losses, North Korean forces have contributed to Russian efforts in contested areas of Kursk, though their overall impact on the broader conflict remains limited.theguardian.com+16theguardian.com+16reddit.com+16kyivindependent.com+4kyivpost.com+4forbes.com+4
The involvement of North Korean troops marks a significant development in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, highlighting the deepening military ties between Moscow and Pyongyang.thesun.co.uk
Yes, the deployment of North Korean troops—especially elite special forces from units like the 11th Army Corps—strongly suggests that Russia is facing a shortage of elite, high-readiness troops and is compensating by drawing on foreign manpower.
Here’s why that conclusion is plausible:
1. Use of Foreign Combat Troops is Unusual for a Major Power
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For a nuclear-armed state with one of the world’s largest militaries, relying on North Korean special forces in an active combat zone is highly irregular.
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Major powers typically prefer to retain control over their operations and avoid political entanglements from foreign boots on the ground.
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If Russia had a large surplus of ready, elite forces, it would be illogical to bring in North Korean troops, especially given the coordination, logistical, and language barriers.
2. Elite Russian Units Have Been Degraded
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Many of Russia’s top-tier units (e.g. VDV, Spetsnaz GRU, Naval Infantry) suffered heavy casualties in the first two years of the war.
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Western intelligence and independent analysis confirm that these units had to be reconstituted using conscripts or minimally trained personnel.
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Even by late 2024, Russia was rotating wounded or depleted brigades out of front-line roles, indicating a need for reinforcement.
3. North Korean Troops Are Replacing, Not Just Supplementing
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Reports indicate that North Korean forces were deployed into active combat zones in Kursk, sometimes integrated into Russian formations, and even wearing Russian uniforms.
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This level of integration implies they are filling operational gaps, not just playing a symbolic or training support role.
4. Elite North Korean Troops Are Costly Assets
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Pyongyang would not lightly risk sending its best troops abroad unless the strategic or economic benefits were high — or unless Russia desperately needed competent manpower in key sectors.
5. Strategic Implications
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If Russia still had a large pool of reliable, elite soldiers, it would likely prefer to:
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Reinforce overstretched sectors with its own vetted units.
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Avoid political complications from foreign troop presence.
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Retain tight control over operational security and command structure.
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That they’re not doing this suggests either:
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Severe depletion of high-quality Russian forces, or
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An effort to preserve what remains of their elite units for higher-priority threats or future contingencies.
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In Summary:
The North Korean deployments are a strong signal of Russian force strain, particularly at the elite level.
It suggests:
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Russia’s best units are degraded, recovering, or being conserved.
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Moscow is increasingly relying on unconventional partnerships to maintain pressure along multiple fronts.
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The strategic situation for Russia is likely more brittle than public messaging suggests — at least in terms of manpower quality.
It’s a sign not of strength, but of strategic necessity.
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