The incoherence of the philosophers - or the incoherence of the incoherence?

"Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology" is a fascinating exchange between David Ray Griffin and Huston Smith. The book is part of a series edited by Griffin, "SUNY series in Constructive Postmodern Thought".

Although Griffin calls his position "postmodern", it's actually a version of Process Theology, a liberal Christian theology heavily indebted to the philosophy and metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead, i.e. a very modern project. Indeed, Whitehead's attempts to create an all-encompassing, rationalist metaphysics and a virtual Theory of Everything strikes me as almost Early Modern, especially since God and theodicy are part of the equation. Whitehead was ignored by the broader philosophical community (I suppose they were more into Heidegger or Wittgenstein), but he had a mesmerizing influence on some liberal Christian theologians, including David Ray Griffin himself. I admit that Whitehead's philosophy of process sounds fascinating!

Griffin's antagonist, Huston Smith, is a Perennialist or Traditionalist. The scholar Mark Sedgwick refer to Smith as a "soft" Traditionalist, and Smith does indeed seem to be more "liberal" than René Guenon, Frithjof Schuon or Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Ironically, it is Smith rather than Griffin who occasionally sounds "postmodern". His personal religious beliefs are highly eclectic, and seem to be a combination of Advaita Vedanta and Gnosticizing Christianity, with a whiff of Theosophy. This makes Smith simultaneously defend both notions close to traditional Christianity (the Trinity, the creedal statements) and notions more typical of Vedanta (God as the impersonal Absolute beyond qualities). Curiously, Smith was once a Process theist himself, while Griffin held to Theosophical notions before he became a Process theologian. Thus, both men are defectors from the other's camp. Indeed, this seems to have been what prompted Griffin to challenge Smith on a debate in the first place.

At bottom, the debate between Griffin and Smith is an exchange between a rationalist philosopher and a mystic. Since the positions of both men are somewhat original, it's hard to make any parallels, but imagine if Leibniz or Kant would debate Bernard of Clairvaux or Ramakrishna. Griffin emphasizes rationality, logic, coherence and science (which he wants to fuse with theology and philosophy). Smith is more into mystical experiences, intuitions, paradox and mystery. Both men stumble heavily on the problem of evil, since both Perennialism and Process Theology affirms that evil is eternal and even in some sense necessary. Smith attempts to take the Vedantist-derived position that evil is really a hidden or higher good, while Griffin affirms the reality of evil, while denying the omnipotence of God, which makes evil virtually impossible to eradicate. The choice between a God that *wont* eradicate evil and one that *can't* eradicate it, sounds somewhat moot!

Another important difference concerns the personality of God, where Smith believes that God is supra-personal while also having a personal aspect, a position Griffin considers incoherent and therefore meaningless. How can anything be supra-personal? Or both supra-personal and personal? To Griffin, God is personal. However, God also seems limited by at least three other metaphysical absolutes (including "creative experience"). Dualism is another point of contention. Griffin rejects dualism in favour of panpsychism, while Smith (as usual) embraces several different strands of opinion at once. Yet another serious difference concerns political and social progress: while both men sound "liberal", Smith is pessimistic about progress, while Griffin believes that a liberal reform program is virtually a religious duty. On one point, the two protagonists sign an uneasy truce: both reject Neo-Darwinism in favour of a theistic evolutionism based on "punk eek". (In reality, Smith is probably a creationist.)

Although the debate isn't particularly fun or entertaining, I was nevertheless strangely fascinated by it. I never met David Ray Griffin or Huston Smith, but I've read some other texts by them. Both men come across as distracted professors, but there the similarity ends. Griffin sounds like an annoying busy body and know-it-all, who've Seen The Light and is incensed by the fact that nobody else gives a damn. Remember: Whitehead's metaphysics explain *everything*, including the essence of God the Father. Imagine that. Smith, by contrast, seems more laid back and even have a somewhat frivolous sense of humour. I can almost see Smith meditating peacefully in an incense-filled room with a stoned Aldous Huxley and a smiling lama in the background. (Perhaps even the animal called lama!) In this debate, however, Smith does get progressively more exasperated. He just can't prehend Griffin.

Another reason for my fascination is that both Ray and Huston seem to co-exist within my own humble self. Five or ten years ago, I would probably have sympathized with Griffin, or at least with his attitude. Everything, including God and the immortal soul, must be *proven* by science, rationalist philosophy, or both. It must be somehow political, too. Thus, Griffin believes in personal immortality because the (purported) scientific facts of parapsychology seem to suggest this. Panpsychism, in contrast to dualism, is at least in principle scientifically verifiable. Et cetera. If one cannot prove a religious viewpoint in this manner...bye! Today, while not "religious", I'm more appreciative of Smith's position. If God exists, he cannot be a "person" in the traditional sense, the paradoxes of quantum physics suggest that even "our" world is ontologically weird, and what makes us think that a human perspective on things is enough?

The main problem with both Process Theology and Perennialism is the inability to solve, or even admit, the problem of evil. The process people attempt to untie the Gordian knot of theodicy by denying the omnipotence of God - a possible solution, but only in a rationalist-speculative sense. The point of religion, usually, is something else than solving metaphysical riddles or mathematical set problems. Indeed, I suspect that this might be one of the reasons why process theology is a distinctly minority position: who wants a god that cannot eradicate evil and suffering? The Perennialist position, at least as stated by Huston Smith, boils down to Auschwitz or the bubonic plague somehow being part of God's perfection. I don't think Smith *really* believes that, showing that his position is just as impossible as that of Griffin. What the solution might be, I don't claim to know, except that "evil" cannot even be coherently conceptualized within the confines of materialism, making that particular "solution" moot as well.

With those reflections, I'll call it a day.