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Credit: David Shankbone |
”The Dawn
of Everything: A New History of Humanity” is an almost 700 pages long tome by US
anthropologist David Graeber (recently deceased) and British archeologist David
Wengrow. It was published last year and received mostly favorable reviews in
the press, although I frankly wonder how many reviewers managed to read the
whole thing! I admit that I haven´t finished the book either, but at about 450
pages, I´m taking my chances posting a review! Stay tuned for further developments.
Although the book deals with archeology and anthropology, its underlying purpose
is unabashedly political. Graeber was an anarchist and activist in the Occupy
movement, and “The Dawn of Everything” could be seen as an attempted leftist or
left-liberal synthesis of human history and “pre”-history. Personally, I consider
the leftist message of the work somewhat peculiar, but I haven´t read Graeber´s
earlier books.
Usually,
leftists postulate some kind of “fall” from a pristine and primordial Edenic state.
In Marxism, the fall is connected to the rise of private property and class society.
Anarchists blame our predicament on the rise of the state. The introduction of
agriculture during the Neolithic Revolution is seen by many as a precondition
for these developments. In radical Green circles, it´s seen as the fall itself.
To some feminists, the fall comes from the outside: matriarchal Old Europe was
invaded and smashed by patriarchal Indo-European tribes from the steppes. Graeber
and Wengrow, on the other hand, reject this notion and criticize it at length. But
*why* do they do this? At least in the first 400+ pages, this isn´t entirely
clear. The authors´ vision of prehistory (probably not their term) is pluralist.
As far back as the archeological record goes, humans have always experimented
with a wide variety of cultural forms, some good, some bad, some perhaps really
ugly. There is no discernable point at which a fall (literal or even metaphorical)
from a utopian state takes place. This also means that there are no “laws” of
historical development, perhaps not even broader trends, and hence no teleology
in human history. This goes against not only Marxism, but also the Western idea
of progress in general, where we rise from a dystopian state towards a destiny
in the stars (or at least in the British Empire or American Century).
I assume
the authors regard the rejection of teleology as intensely liberating. It means
that things don´t have to be this way, that another world really is possible.
The failure of, say, Marxist teleology can thus be countered by arguing that actually
no teleology exists at all, but precisely for that reason, class society isn´t
a necessary stage (albeit a shitty and gritty one) society has to pass through
before the dawn of classless communism. History could have taken a different
turn, indeed *did* take many different turns before class society or capitalism
became dominant, and presumably could do so again.
More curious
is Graeber´s and Wengrow´s insistence that “the origins of social inequality”
is the wrong question to ask, certainly today, when opposition to increased
social inequality is one of the hallmarks of (real) leftism (as opposed to liberal
leftoid-ism). Instead, the authors seem to emphasize “freedom”, all the while
admitting that even in free societies, there could be a lot of social hierarchies.
Perhaps their point is that freedom is a precondition for everything else, including
attempts to create a socially equal society? Much of the anthropological
material deal with societies in which there is no central power, or in which such
power is heavily circumscribed, and private property can´t be easily
transformed into social power over others. Graeber and Wengrow claim that there
are really two forms of equality to begin with: one form in which everyone
really is exactly the same, and another form in which the differences between
individuals is regarded as so great that no meaningful hierarchical sorting can
be made. I think it´s obvious that they prefer option two. Of course, other leftists
could claim that maybe the writers are too moderate…
So much for
the politics of this tome. Otherwise, I admit that much of the archeological
and anthropological material presented in “The Dawn of Everything” is fascinating,
and even clears up a question mark or two I had about our distant past. For instance,
why does Göbekli Tepe suddenly emerge in the Mesolithic (or was it the
Neolithic or the Epipaleolithic) as Minerva from the head of Jupiter, fully
formed, with no apparent precursors, a gigantic necropolis of stone in an age
supposedly consisting of small bands of hunters and gatherers only? Graham Hancock
and his fans had a field day with that one, claiming it as virtual smoking gun
evidence for Atlantis. However, it now turns out that Göbekli Tepe, while clearly
a major accomplishment in its own right, *did* have precursors, both in the
Middle East and across Eurasia. Already during the Upper Paleolithic, when the
climate stabilized in the wake of the “last Ice Age”, hunters and gatherers
were building large settlements and temples, usually of wood and often temporary
ones, and also carried out sumptuous burials. It seems human creativity flourished
the moment our ancestors could think of other things than mere physical
survival. The authors argue that these building projects were perfectly possible
to carry out without a state power or even a strong chiefdom, citing known
examples in the anthropological record of “tribal” peoples where authority
structures are temporarily erected to deal with some common task requiring a
mobilization of manpower, but melt away when the task is finished.
Another
important insight from the book is that the “transition” (to use teleological
language) between hunting-gathering and agriculture took thousands of years and
many “false starts” (to use such language again). The first exclusive farmers
in Europe were actually massacred by more powerful hunters and gatherers! Many
peoples around the world are quite happy alternating between hunting-gathering,
horticulture and agriculture, seemingly oblivious to the stages of societal evolution
imposed on them by Western scholars. Besides, “horticulture” can be highly advanced,
as in periodical burning of large tracts of wood to make certain desirable
plants grow more abundantly, rather than “primitive gardens” in some unmanaged
jungle.
The Indus
Valley Civilization (IVC) is often depicted as a gigantic anomaly, due to its peculiar
combination of uniformity and seeming lack of authority, not to mention its peaceful
character. I don´t think the authors ever address that peace dividend, but they
do comment on the first two anomalies. It turns out that there are many early
city-states around the world that share precisely these traits: uniformity of
one kind or another, and a seeming lack of authority at the center. In ancient
Mesopotamia, the Sumerian towns look more egalitarian than the tribal peoples
in the hinterland, while classical theory should perhaps expect us to find the opposite
arrangement. The authors believe that the Sumerian towns were democratic and
run on a daily basis by benign administrators, while the tribals were warriors
and brigands who rejected both democracy and bureaucracy in favor of rule by
authoritarian charismatic kings. In Mesoamerica, Teotihuacan was another
democracy, with archeologists scratching their heads about the whereabouts of
the local rulers. The authors also present evidence that at least some of the
Native peoples who supported Cortes against the Aztecs had a democratic form of
government.
If Graeber
and Wengrow have any theory of social change, it is the previously mentioned
pluralist perspective, which the authors sometimes dub “schizmogenesis”. Human
groups define themselves by consciously inventing and cultivating differences with
neighboring groups. If your neighbors have slavery and large feasts, your tribe
will tend to reject slavery and live in frugality. If your neighbors have a
democracy and are relatively peaceful, your society will become “heroic” and
war-prone. In this scenario, the superstructure seems relatively independent of
the economic base, with very different cultural patterns arising from the same material
conditions. Religion is treated by the authors as an independent variable, and
they speculate that the centralization of the Egyptian and Inca cultures was
caused by religious factors. Perhaps this *does* explain some otherwise
completely baffling tenets of the Egyptian civilization, for instance the
building of the pyramids as tombs for the pharaohs, an activity that doesn´t
seem to have any obvious “material” explanation (note also that it eventually ceased).
The authors
believe that “the state has no origins” and didn´t need to happen. They theorize
that there are three sources of social power in human society: control of violence,
control of information, and individual charisma. In a modern society, control of
violence is connected to the idea of sovereignty over a specific territory,
while control of information is exercised by a gigantic bureaucracy, and our “democracy”
is really a winner-takes-it-all contest between quasi-aristocratic factions
endowed with charisma. This, then, is the modern state. But the confluence of
these three strands of domination need not have happened, and indeed didn´t
happen for a very long time. There are cultures in which some people are
initiated into arcane religious knowledge by something resembling a petty
bureaucracy (control of information), but the two other factors aren´t present.
In other cultures, the kings and their armed retinues only exercised sovereignty
if they could personally show up and insert themselves into the plot. And
charismatic leaders can of course exercise control even without recognized sovereignty
or a bureaucracy. Graeber and Wengrow point out that today, the three types of
domination are coming apart again. There are global institutions (such as the
WTO or the IMF) without any corresponding concept of global sovereignty. Crypto-currencies
and private security companies have acquired a new significance, undermining
the state´s monopoly on currency and violence. (Perhaps there are also informal
economic networks in the wake of the lockdowns and cost of living crisis?) The “teleology”
seems to be working in reverse…
If there is
any drawback to “The Dawn of Everything”, it might ironically be the book´s
huge popularity among the chattering classes. Such things are ephemeral. Who
today remembers “Empire” by Hardt and Negri, the book that supposedly should
have changed everything back in 2000? And what happened to Naomi Klein, Shoshana
Zuboff, the Great Turning, the Fourth Turning, and what not? It wouldn´t surprise
me if “The Dawn of Everything” goes the same way, being quietly forgotten already
circa 2024. It would perhaps be a loss, since the work – despite its left-liberal
leanings – does say a lot of interesting things that could perhaps be developed
further.