"Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James, Bergson, Whitehead and Hartshorne" is the interminable title of this volume in the equally interminable SUNY series in Constructive Postmodern Thought, edited by David Ray Griffin. Thus, we are talking about yet another book trying to convert the world and other creative occasions to the process philosophy of Whitehead, Hartshorne, Cobb and (arguably) Griffin himself.
Nothing wrong with that.
Although I don't consider myself a convert, I'm an unofficial fan of many aspects of this particular philosophy. Still, I sometimes wonder if Griffin has a day job? The number of volumes written or edited by this man is almost a "process" itself...
"Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy" is intended as an introduction to the process philosophy (later process theology) developed by Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. The book also contains articles on three somewhat earlier philosophers whom Griffin considers precursors to process thought: Charles Peirce, William James and Henri Bergson. While the volume is edited and introduced by Griffin, four other writers have been invited to join the fray: John B. Cobb, Jr. (Griffin's former teacher), Marcus P. Ford, Pete A.Y. Gunter and Peter Ochs.
In a collection of this kind, it's inevitable that some contributions are better than others. The best are David Ray Griffin's introductory chapter "Constructive Postmodern Philosophy" and the chapter on Charles Hartshorne, also authored by Griffin. A close second would be Ford's attempt to claim William James for process philosophy. Cobb's article on Whitehead is more difficult, Gunter's piece on Bergson is a good introduction but no more, and Ochs' ruminations on Peirce feel completely misplaced (I stopped reading them half-way). Ochs seems to be a "deconstructive" postmodern thinker of the kind Griffin bashes in the rest of the volume - he doesn't even believe in the correspondence theory of truth!
The term "postmodern" in the title is something of a misnomer. While it's true that the process philosophers used the term "postmodern" long before it was hi-jacked by the poststructuralists (something Griffin is at pains to point out in a rather extensive footnote), today the term *is* associated with a certain kind of relativist, deconstructive and nihilistic continental philosophy. "Constructive postmodern philosophy" sounds almost like an oxymoron! Griffin insists on using it since he believes that modern philosophy is at a dead end. Since a simple return to premodern or precritical philosophy isn't feasible, the only solution is to transcend modern philosophy in favour of something new and hence "postmodern". Ironically, Griffin believes that deconstructive philosophy is part of the problem: it is "mostmodern" rather than "postmodern". The scepticism built into modern philosophy at least from Hume onwards reaches its logical climax in deconstructive discourse, and then self-destructs.
"Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy" speaks for itself, but to briefly summarize its main points, Griffin believes that some of the main problems with modern philosophy are mind-matter dualism, physicalism, sensationism and a denial of objectively valid ethics and aesthetics. This culminates in a denial of God. Griffin considers himself to be a Christian, although process philosophy can easily do without the Christian context (neither Whitehead nor Hartshorne were explicitly Christian). The untenable and inexplicable dualisms between mind and matter, fact and value, or subjective and objective are "solved" by physicalism, which simply does away with mind, value and subjectivity altogether in favour of dead matter. Meanwhile, sensationism leads to scepticism, since the only thing our senses have direct contact with are mind-generated ideas, rather than real physical objects. Note the contradiction between physicalism and sensationism! Finally, the whole edifice crumbles into relativism or outright nihilism (Griffin's favourite whipping boy is Richard Rorty).
Griffin believes that the process thought of Whitehead and Hartshorne has the solution to the philosophical cul-de-sacs of modernity. Dualism and physicalism are replaced by a form of panpsychism, which Griffin gives the somewhat unwieldy name panexperientialism. Everything that exists is both matter and consciousness at the same time (Whitehead's "creative occasions"). Sensationism is replaced by "radical" or "deep" empiricism, which holds that most of our knowledge doesn't come from our five senses but from a kind of infra-empirical sources (Whitehead's "prehension"). How values, ethics and aesthetics are reintroduced is less clear to the present reviewer, except that it has something to do with the interconnectedness of all living and non-living entities in the cosmos. God is a kind of World-Soul which consists of all "creative occasions" and somehow connects them to a single whole. Thus, process philosophy could be seen as a form of pantheism or perhaps "panentheism", since God seems to be in some sense personal. God's existence makes values objective and our lives meaningful. In this manner, process philosophy overcomes the relativism and nihilism of the modern world.
Griffin is at pains to portray process thought as compatible with modern science. Its perspective is strongly evolutionary. Indeed, the god of process philosophy isn't the omnipotent, impassable, atemporal God of the Bible. Rather, God necessarily co-exists with the world, and co-evolves with it. Griffin claims that some scientific evidence strongly suggests panexperientialism, while parapsychology suggests that there are other sources of knowledge than our five senses. Ford and Gunter also mention parapsychology in their respective articles on James and Bergson. While some secular scientists might perhaps be wooed to accept that mind and matter are two sides of the same coin, I don't think the same goes for parapsychology!
Despite being an unofficial fan, I do have various objections to process philosophy. The main one would be its inability to solve the problem of evil (by contrast, Griffin quite honestly believes that it *has* solved it). If I've understood Griffin correctly, he holds that God is the dominant monad in the universe, in effect acting as the soul of the cosmic "body". In the same manner, human consciousness seems to be the dominant monad in the human body. While it's true that the human mind isn't omnipotent (try to consciously regulate your intestines!), humans can nevertheless fight evil in their own bodies in a variety of ways: medication, amputation, exercise, etc. If so, God should be able to fight evil in his "body" in the same manner. Why can't God stop genocide by "medication" or "amputation" (or just strike down people with the almost proverbial lightning bolts)? God should at least be more powerful than the most powerful of his co-creations! A God that is *less* powerful than humans, isn't really a god at all, but simply an impersonal élan vital á la Bergson. And yet, the god of process theology does seem to be less powerful than humans. Indeed, Griffin seems to be saying that this isn't a voluntary self-contraction from God's part, but a necessary trait of His very nature. I suppose you could say that this "solves" the problem of evil and suffering by doing away with divine omnipotence, keeping only divine goodness, but it's a response most people will consider purely abstract and academic. What people really want when requesting a theodicy is some kind of assurance that God is indeed both good and all-powerful. If none is forthcoming, atheism is the logical conclusion - not some nebulous half-way house with a god who's a fundamentally nice guy, but has less power than the United Nations!
And no, I'm not digressing. Griffin does make several theological points in this "philosophical" book, so I make no apologies about chiming in. Besides, the main reason why people embrace process philosophy seems to be its all-knowing character - it sounds like a curious mix of modern science, postmodern spirituality and premodern metaphysics. People who read Whitehead sometimes report what amounts to conversion experiences. Process thinkers have also attempted to combine Whitehead's and Hartshorne's philosophy with feminism, ecologism, religious pluralism and similar left-liberal concerns. This also makes the philosophy all-encompassing. Had I discovered some of Griffin's innumerable books about ten years ago, I might have "converted" myself...
I mean, these guys do have pretty neat solutions to many vexing metaphysical issues, don't they? ;-)
As indicated, there are many books on process philosophy. There is probably no particular reason why anyone should chose "Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy" over any other book edited by David Griffin. Still, it's not a bad book, and it does contain other interesting ideas apart from the ones mentioned in this review (in which I concentrated on Griffin's articles).
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