Ashtar Command Book Blog : A memo to the War Department

Saturday, October 4, 2025

A memo to the War Department

Maybe the US Department of War should use more ChatGPT? TL/DR: Battleships in the proper sense became obsolete already during World War II, and aircraft carriers - while still useful - may become vulnerable to hypersonic missiles in the near future. Especially in conflicts with China and Russia.

Is it true that large battleships are more or less obsolete due to hypersonic missiles?

This is a hotly debated question in defense circles right now. Let me break it down for you:

1. Why people say large surface ships are "obsolete"

Hypersonic missiles (Mach 5+) can travel extremely fast and maneuver unpredictably, reducing the reaction time for ship defenses.
A carrier battle group or large destroyer is a big, high-value target. Losing one would be catastrophic both militarily and politically.
Modern hypersonics (like Russia’s Tsirkon or China’s DF-21D/DF-26 “carrier killers”) are explicitly designed to penetrate U.S. Navy Aegis defenses and destroy carriers.
Unlike aircraft or submarines, ships can’t hide well; they are relatively slow and easy to track by satellites, drones, or over-the-horizon radar.
Even layered defenses (SM-6 interceptors, CIWS, electronic warfare) are strained by the speed, altitude, and maneuverability of hypersonics.

2. Counterarguments: Why ships may not be "dead"

Defense technology is also advancing: directed energy (lasers), railguns, faster interceptors, and electronic countermeasures are being tested to counter hypersonics.
Hypersonics are expensive: only a few countries can make and deploy them in numbers, and each missile costs millions. Saturation strikes (hundreds at once) may be rare.
Carriers are mobile airbases: they still provide unique global reach for air power without needing foreign bases.
Distributed lethality doctrine: navies are adapting by dispersing capabilities across smaller ships, submarines, and unmanned vessels, reducing reliance on a single "big deck".
Real combat uncertainty: no hypersonic has yet been proven in a naval war context. We don’t know how effective they’d be against a fully prepared battle group with multiple layers of defenses.

3. Current military thinking

Most analysts don’t say carriers and big ships are “obsolete” but rather “more vulnerable than before”.
They are still crucial for power projection in lower-intensity conflicts (e.g. Middle East operations, humanitarian aid, deterrence).
Against a peer adversary (China, Russia), carriers would likely operate farther from the coast, relying more on drones, long-range aircraft, and stand-off weapons.
Navies are shifting toward a hybrid fleet: carriers + submarines + smaller missile ships + drones.

✅ In short: Hypersonic missiles are a game-changer that makes large ships riskier in high-end war, but they are not completely obsolete yet. Their role is evolving—from unchallenged dominance to being one part of a broader, more distributed naval strategy.

Do you want me to compare this situation with what happened to battleships after WWII, when aircraft carriers replaced them? That analogy is often brought up.

Yes, please.

Great — the battleship → carrier shift is a really useful analogy for today’s “carrier vs hypersonic” debate. Here’s how they compare:

1. Battleships Before WWII

Battleships were once the ultimate measure of naval power: huge guns, heavy armor, able to duel at long range.
Naval strategy for centuries revolved around them — fleets were designed around protecting or challenging battleships.
They were symbols of national prestige and deterrence.

2. What Changed in WWII

Air power proved decisive: aircraft from carriers could strike ships beyond gun range. The sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse (1941) by Japanese aircraft, and Yamato (1945), showed that even the most powerful battleships were vulnerable.
Carriers were flexible: they projected power not only at sea but deep inland. Aircraft could scout, strike, and defend at distances battleships could never match.
Result: battleships became obsolete almost overnight. After WWII, most were scrapped or relegated to shore bombardment.

3. Today’s Carriers

Carriers now occupy the symbolic and practical role battleships once did: centerpiece of naval power, prestige assets, floating airbases.
A U.S. supercarrier (like the Gerald R. Ford) can project force globally without needing bases, making it a unique tool of American strategy.

4. Hypersonics as the "New Carrier Aircraft"

Just as carrier-based aircraft out-ranged battleship guns, hypersonic missiles out-range carrier aircraft (and arrive much faster).
Carriers are now the ones at risk of being struck before they can respond.
China’s DF-21D and DF-26 “carrier killer” missiles are often compared to Japan’s carrier strike at Pearl Harbor — designed to neutralize capital ships before they can dominate.

5. Key Differences from the WWII Analogy

Carriers still have unmatched flexibility: they support land campaigns, no foreign bases needed, useful for low-intensity conflicts.
Defense vs offense race: In WWII, battleships had almost no defense against air power. Today, carriers have layered defenses (Aegis, SM-6 interceptors, electronic warfare, decoys, soon lasers). Whether they can consistently stop hypersonics is still untested.
Cost factor: Carriers are astronomically expensive (~$13B for USS Gerald R. Ford), while hypersonic missiles (a few million each) are far cheaper. This is similar to how cheap aircraft could sink a battleship.
Distributed lethality: Unlike battleships, which had no real alternative, carriers today share the field with submarines, drones, and land-based missiles. Navies are already adjusting doctrine.

6. The Emerging Pattern

Battleships weren’t useless right away — they were still used in WWII for shore bombardment and escort duty, but their central role was finished.
Carriers may follow a similar path: not instantly obsolete, but increasingly confined to “permissive” environments (wars against weaker powers, deterrence, presence missions).
Against peer adversaries with hypersonics, they might be forced further out to sea, relying on long-range drones and stealth aircraft instead of sitting close to contested shores.

✅ Summary:
Carriers today are to hypersonic missiles what battleships were to carrier aircraft in WWII. Not instantly useless, but their era of unchallenged dominance may be ending. Like battleships, they’ll probably survive in secondary roles and prestige functions, while navies shift toward more dispersed, survivable, and cost-effective platforms.

Would you like me to sketch what a “post-carrier navy” might look like in the hypersonic era — i.e. what kinds of ships, drones, and submarines would take over the role of today’s carriers?

Yes, please.

Alright — let’s imagine what a “post-carrier navy” could look like if hypersonics and precision long-range strike really do push supercarriers into a secondary role.

1. The Core Problem Carriers Solve

Carriers exist because they give a navy:

Global airpower without foreign bases (planes, drones, helicopters)
Symbolic presence (prestige, deterrence)
Flexible utility (combat, disaster relief, logistics, showing the flag)

So, in a world where carriers are too vulnerable, a navy has to recreate those functions with smaller, harder-to-kill, cheaper, or more dispersed systems.

2. The Likely Ingredients of a Post-Carrier Navy

A. Submarines Become Central

Nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and ballistic missile subs (SSBNs) already dominate nuclear deterrence and sea denial.
Future versions may carry long-range drones or hypersonic missiles themselves, allowing them to project power without surfacing.
Stealth is their protection — unlike giant carriers, they are very hard to find.

B. Drone Carriers & Unmanned Surface Vessels

Smaller ships or even container ships repurposed as drone carriers.
They could launch swarms of cheap drones for reconnaissance, electronic warfare, or kamikaze strikes.
Sacrificing a drone carrier is much less catastrophic than losing a $13B supercarrier.

C. Arsenal Ships (“missile barges”)

A ship designed to carry hundreds of long-range missiles (Tomahawk, hypersonic, anti-ship, land attack).
It doesn’t need planes — it’s basically a floating missile magazine, operating under the protection of escorts and submarines.
The U.S. toyed with this idea in the 1990s, but it might make a comeback.

D. Land- and Space-Based Systems

Long-range bombers (like the B-21 Raider) could replace some carrier strike functions, flying from home bases.
Land-based hypersonic missile batteries (mobile launchers) could provide sea-denial in coastal regions.
Satellites + drones provide global surveillance that once required carrier aircraft.

E. Smaller, Dispersed Carriers

Instead of 11 giant U.S. supercarriers, you might see 20–30 smaller “light carriers” (amphibious assault ships like USS America, equipped with F-35Bs and drones).
Individually weaker, but collectively harder to neutralize with a few hypersonic strikes.

3. Doctrine Shift: From “Capital Ship” to “Distributed Fleet”

WWII navies revolved around a few massive capital ships (first battleships, then carriers).
A post-carrier navy would spread firepower across many platforms: subs, drones, small carriers, arsenal ships, missile destroyers.
This is called “distributed lethality” — harder to target, harder to overwhelm.

4. The Transition Period

Carriers won’t disappear overnight. The U.S. and China are still building them because:
- They’re unmatched in low-intensity conflicts (Middle East, Africa, deterrence patrols).
- They’re powerful symbols of national prestige.
But in a high-end war (U.S. vs China, NATO vs Russia), they may be pushed far offshore, launching long-range drones and aircraft instead of operating close to hostile coasts.

✅ Summary:
A post-carrier navy would likely be built around submarines, drone carriers, arsenal ships, and distributed smaller vessels, with heavy reliance on space and cyber for coordination. Instead of “one giant floating airbase,” power projection would look more like a web of dispersed, flexible strike platforms.

Would you like me to make a side-by-side comparison: a 2025 carrier strike group vs. a 2050 post-carrier strike group (with drones, arsenal ships, subs, etc.) — to visualize how different the fleets might look?

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