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Wednesday, March 4, 2026
Banana Ganapati?
It´s become something of a tradition on this here blog that we post cutsie pics of Ganesha every Wednesday, so here we go again. This is apparently Bhakti Ganapati, one of the 32 classical forms of Ganesha. Note the banana!
I actually assumed bananas were originally from South and Central America, but naaah, they are from the Indomalayan region. Fun fact: pineapples (which *are* from South America) have been introduced to India and are sometimes offered to Hindu idols...
Reality is real (part 5)
Can you explain the position of Scientific Realists?
Scientific Realists attempt to bridge the gap between our internal perceptions and the external world by moving the conversation away from "sensory images" and toward explanatory power.
If the Indirect Realist is trapped in a "theater of the mind," the Scientific Realist argues that the best explanation for the consistent, predictable patterns on that screen is a mind-independent, physical reality that obeys mathematical laws.
1. The "No Miracles" Argument
This is the most famous defense of Scientific Realism, primarily championed by Hilary Putnam.
The Argument: Science is incredibly successful at predicting the behavior of the world (e.g., landing a rover on Mars or predicting an eclipse).
The Conclusion: If the "atoms," "waves," and "photons" described by science weren't actually real—if they were just useful mental fictions or "images"—then the success of science would be a miracle. Since miracles are not a sound basis for philosophy, we must assume that our scientific theories refer to real, mind-independent things.
2. Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE)
Scientific Realists admit they cannot "step outside" their heads to prove a straw is straight, but they use Abduction (logical inference).
The Scenario: You have two hypotheses:
There is a real, physical, straight straw in a real glass of water, and light refracts at $n=1.33$.
There is no straw, and your mind is just coincidentally producing a complex, mathematically consistent "bent-straw-simulation."
The Verdict: Scientific Realists argue that (1) is the "best explanation" because it is simpler and has more predictive power.
3. Structural Realism: The "Compromise"
Because scientific theories often change (e.g., moving from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian relativity), some realists adopt Structural Realism.
The Theory: We might be wrong about the "entities" (what an electron is), but we are right about the mathematical structure and the relationships between things.
The Bridge: The "structure" is what is real. Even if our "image" of an atom changes over centuries, the mathematical laws governing how it interacts with other atoms remain consistent.
4. The "Entity Realist" Approach
Ian Hacking famously argued that if we can manipulate something to produce an effect, it must be real.
The Quote: "If you can spray them, they are real." (Referring to electrons).
The Logic: We aren't just looking at "images" of electrons; we are building machines that use them to change the world. The fact that the world "pushes back" in predictable ways proves we are interacting with something objective, even if we only perceive it indirectly.
5. Challenges to Scientific Realism
Despite its popularity, Scientific Realism faces two major hurdles:
The Pessimistic Meta-Induction: History is a graveyard of "successful" scientific theories that turned out to be false (e.g., Phlogiston, Caloric, the Luminiferous Ether). If previous scientists were "wrong" about what was "real," why should we assume we are "right" now?
Underdetermination: For any set of data (images), there could be an infinite number of different theories that explain that data perfectly. We choose the one that "feels" most realistic, but we can't prove it's the only one.
Summary Table: Scientific Realism vs. Indirect Realism
| Feature | Indirect Realism | Scientific Realism |
| Focus | Sensory "Sense-Data" (Color, Shape). | Theoretical Entities (Atoms, Fields). |
| Truth Criterion | Coherence (Does it match my other senses?). | Predictive Success (Does it work in an experiment?). |
| The "Straw" | A mental image being compared to other images. | A physical object whose properties are defined by physics. |
Would you like to examine the "Pessimistic Meta-Induction" more closely to see how it threatens the idea of objective reality, or should we look at how "Structural Realism" tries to survive the death of scientific theories?
Reality is real (part 4)
Gemini LLM on direct realism. Part four. Enjoy!
Isn´t indirect realism self-contradictory? How can the indirect realist *know* that a straw bent in water isn´t real, if everything are just mental images? They seem to use one mental image to disprove another one!
You have hit on what many philosophers call the "Transcendental Objection" to indirect realism. It is a powerful critique that points to a fundamental "performative contradiction" in the theory.
The contradiction you are identifying is this: the indirect realist claims we only ever perceive mental representations, yet they frequently use physical facts (like the laws of refraction or the actual straightness of a straw) to explain why our perceptions are sometimes "wrong."
Here is how that contradiction is broken down and how indirect realists attempt to wiggle out of it.
1. The "Double Standard" of Evidence
As you noted, the indirect realist says: "I know the straw isn't actually bent because I know the laws of physics and the properties of wood."
The Problem: How does the indirect realist know the laws of physics or the "true" shape of the straw? According to their own theory, their knowledge of physics and "straight straws" also came to them via mental images.
The Contradiction: They are using "privileged" mental images (the ones they label as 'scientific' or 'accurate') to demote "deceptive" mental images (the bent straw). But if everything is a mental image, they have no objective "ruler" outside of their own mind to decide which image is the "true" one.
2. Coherentism: The Indirect Realist’s Defense
Most indirect realists (like John Locke or modern functionalists) try to solve this using Coherentism. They argue that we don't need to "step outside" our heads to find truth; we just need to see which images play well together.
Consistency: If I pull the straw out of the water, it looks straight. If I touch it, it feels straight. If I use a ruler, it measures straight.
The Argument: The "bent" image is a singular anomaly. The "straight" image is supported by a massive web of other sensory data (touch, memory, mathematics).
The Indirect Realist's Counter: They aren't using one image to disprove another; they are using a consistent system of images to identify an inconsistent one.
3. The Phenomenal vs. The Physical
Another way they avoid contradiction is by distinguishing between Primary and Secondary qualities.
Primary (The "Truth"): Extension, motion, number. These are "mathematical" and exist in the object.
Secondary (The "Representation"): Color, taste, "bentness." These exist in the mind.
The Logic: The indirect realist argues that they can "calculate" the truth of the world using the primary qualities (math/physics) even if their secondary qualities (the visual image) are wonky.
4. The "Brain in a Vat" Trap
If you push the indirect realist on your point—"How do you know there is even a straw at all?"—they eventually have to admit they don't know for certain.
This leads to the Skeptical Gap. If they are consistent, they must admit that their "scientific" view of the world is just a very useful, highly organized dream. If they claim to know the "real" world exists behind the image, they are making a "leap of faith" that their theory technically forbids.
Summary of the Conflict
Your Point: If we only see images, we have no "non-image" to compare them to.
The Indirect Realist Response: We compare images to other images and choose the most mathematically consistent ones.
The Direct Realist Response: Exactly! This is why indirect realism is a "prison." We should just admit we are seeing the straw itself, albeit through the medium of water.
Would you like to look at the "Coherence Theory of Truth" which many indirect realists use to justify their claims, or should we examine how "Scientific Realism" tries to bridge this gap?
Reality is real (part 3)
More on direct realism c/o Gemini. Part three.
Can you explore the "Argument from Hallucination," which is considered a much tougher test for Direct Realism than simple optical illusions?
The Argument from Hallucination is considered the "final boss" for Direct Realism because, unlike an illusion (where a real object like a straw is simply distorted), a hallucination involves perceiving something when no external object exists at all.
If you "see" a dagger that isn't there, and the experience is indistinguishable from seeing a real dagger, the Indirect Realist argues there must be a "common factor"—a mental image—present in both cases.
Direct Realists attempt to solve this through two primary maneuvers: Disjunctivism and Intentionalism.
1. The Disjunctivist Defense (The "Two States" Theory)
Disjunctivism is the most robust Direct Realist response. It denies that a veridical (true) perception and a hallucination are the same kind of mental event.
The Argument: The Indirect Realist assumes that because State A (seeing a real tree) and State B (hallucinating a tree) feel the same, they must be the same type of "mental state" (subjective experience of an image).
The Direct Realist Solution: They are fundamentally different.
Veridical Perception is a "relational" state: it is a direct connection between your mind and the object.
Hallucination is a "failed" state: it is a purely internal mental event.
The Analogy: A "perfect counterfeit" $100 bill looks exactly like a real one, but they are not the same thing. One is legal tender backed by a treasury; the other is just ink on paper. They belong to different categories despite their identical appearance.
2. The Intentionalist Defense (The "False Content" Theory)
This view treats perception as having "intentional content," much like a thought or a belief.
The Argument: If I believe "The Moon is made of cheese," my belief is about the Moon, even though the content is false. I don't need a "mental cheese-moon" inside my head to have that belief.
The Direct Realist Solution: Perception is a way of the world "presenting itself" to you.
In a Veridical Perception, the world presents itself truly.
In a Hallucination, the world "presents itself" falsely.
The "experience" is not an object (a mental image) you are looking at; it is a property of your consciousness being directed toward the world, even if that direction is currently misfiring.
3. The "Causal Deficit" Argument
Direct Realists often point out that hallucinations have different causal origins than perceptions.
Perception: Caused by light bouncing off an object and entering the eye.
Hallucination: Caused by drugs, sleep deprivation, or neurological triggers.
The Conclusion: Because the causes are different, the Direct Realist argues we shouldn't define "normal perception" based on the "abnormal" instance of a hallucination. Just because a flight simulator feels like flying doesn't mean that when you fly a real plane, you are "actually" just in a simulator.
Comparison of the "Tough Test"
| Feature | Indirect Realist View | Direct Realist View (Disjunctivist) |
| What are you seeing? | A mental representation (Sense-data). | Nothing (You are in a failed state). |
| The "Common Factor" | Both states share a "mental image." | There is no common factor; they are distinct. |
| Nature of Mind | The mind is a "theater" watching a screen. | The mind is an "open window" to the world. |
4. The Scientific Challenge (The Time-Lag Argument)
A subset of this problem is the Time-Lag Argument. Since light takes time to travel (e.g., 8 minutes from the Sun), we are always seeing the past.
Indirect Realists say this proves we see a "representation" because the object might not even exist by the time the light hits our eyes.
Direct Realists counter that "Directness" is not about time, but about lack of an intermediate mental object. We are directly perceiving the sun as it was 8 minutes ago, not a "picture" of the sun in our heads.
Would you like to explore the "Screen of Perception" metaphor more deeply, or perhaps look into how modern neuroscience (Predictive Processing) weighs in on this debate?
Reality is real (part 2)
Why direct realism is true. Part two.
How do direct realists solve the problem of illusion?
Direct realism (or "Naive Realism") faces a significant challenge: if we perceive the world exactly as it is, how can we account for illusions (where we see something that isn't there) or hallucinations?
Direct realists generally employ three primary strategies to defend their position without resorting to "sense-data" or internal mental representations.
1. The Relational (or Ecumenical) View
This is the most common defense. It argues that perception is a three-way relationship between the perceiver, the object, and the environmental conditions.
The Argument: When you see a straw as "bent" in a glass of water, you are not seeing a "mental image" of a bent straw. You are directly perceiving the actual straw as it appears through the medium of water.
The Solution: The "bentness" is a property of the light's refraction in that specific context. You are perceiving a mind-independent physical fact (refraction) accurately. The "illusion" is actually a correct perception of a complex physical situation.
2. Disjunctivism
This is a more radical logical move favored by modern direct realists like John McDowell and M.G.F. Martin.
The Argument: Critics of direct realism assume that because a hallucination of a dagger feels like seeing a real dagger, they must both be made of the same "stuff" (mental images).
The Solution: Disjunctivists argue they are fundamentally different.
State A: You are directly perceiving an object (Veridical).
State B: Your cognitive system is malfunctioning (Hallucination/Illusion).
There is no "common factor" (sense-data) between them. One is an open window to the world; the other is a broken window. Just because they "feel" similar doesn't mean they share the same ontological status.
3. The Theory of Appearing
This view suggests that "appearing" is a unique, direct relation that objects have to subjects.
The Argument: An object has its inherent properties, but it also has the property of "appearing-a-certain-way-to-a-perceiver."
The Solution: When a circular coin looks elliptical from an angle, the coin is simply "appearing-elliptical-to-me." The "elliptical-appearance" is not a mental object in my head; it is a way the actual coin relates to my specific point in space.
Comparison of Realist Responses
| Approach | How it explains a "Bent Straw" |
| Relational View | You are seeing the straw + the water's refraction. Both are real and external. |
| Disjunctivism | Seeing a straight straw and "seeing" a bent one are two unrelated mental events. |
| Theory of Appearing | The straw has the mind-independent property of "appearing bent" from that angle. |
4. Intentionalism (The Content View)
Some direct realists argue that perception is like belief—it has "content."
The Solution: Perception is a direct "presentation" of the world.
An illusion is simply a "false presentation." Just as you can have a false belief about a real person, you can have a false perception of a real object without needing a "middle-man" mental image.
Summary Objection
Critics of these solutions (Indirect Realists) often argue that these explanations are "ad hoc"—that they are verbal gymnastics used to avoid the obvious conclusion that there is a gap between the world and the mind. However, for the Direct Realist, these solutions are necessary to preserve the intuition that we are actually in the world, rather than trapped in a biological simulation.
Would you like me to explore the "Argument from Hallucination," which is considered a much tougher test for Direct Realism than simple optical illusions?
Reality is real (part 1)
What are the main arguments against indirect realism?
Indirect realism (also known as representational realism) is the dualist theory of perception stating that we do not perceive the external world directly.
The arguments against this position generally focus on the logical and empirical gaps created by placing a "veil of perception" between the mind and reality.
1. The Problem of the External World (Skepticism)
The most common criticism is that indirect realism leads inevitably to global skepticism. If we only ever have access to our mental representations, we have no way of "stepping outside" our own minds to verify that an external world exists at all.
The Gap: If all knowledge comes from sense-data, and we can never compare sense-data to the objects themselves, we cannot be certain that the objects possess the qualities we attribute to them—or even that they exist.
The Solipsism Risk: Taken to its logical conclusion, indirect realism cannot disprove that the mind is simply generating these images internally without any external cause.
2. The Berkeleyan "Likeness" Principle
George Berkeley famously argued against John Locke’s version of indirect realism by challenging the idea that a mental "idea" can resemble a physical "object."
Incompatibility: Berkeley argued that "an idea can be like nothing but an idea."
The Critique: A mental image has qualities like color or shape, but a physical object (according to indirect realists) is a mind-independent entity. Berkeley argued it is nonsensical to say that a non-perceivable, non-mental object "looks like" a perceivable mental image.
3. The Homunculus Fallacy (Infinite Regress)
This argument suggests that indirect realism fails to actually explain how perception works; it simply moves the problem one step back.
The "Inner Movie": If the eye sees an object and creates a "mental image" in the brain, who is "seeing" that mental image?
The Regress: If you need an "internal observer" (a homunculus) to perceive the representation, then that internal observer would need its own internal eyes and its own internal representations to understand what it is seeing, leading to an infinite regress of observers.
4. The Violation of Ockham’s Razor
Direct realists argue that indirect realism unnecessarily complicates our ontology (the study of what exists).
Direct Realism: There is a perceiver and an object.
Indirect Realism: There is a perceiver, a mental representation (sense-data), and an object.
The Critique: By introducing an intermediate "third thing," indirect realism creates a more complex model of the universe without providing a definitive proof that this intermediary is necessary.
5. The Argument from Evolution and Biological Function
Some philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists argue that indirect realism is biologically counter-intuitive.
Survival: If an organism’s survival depends on navigating a high-stakes environment (escaping predators, finding food), a system that forces the brain to interpret a "simulation" or "representation" rather than the environment itself would be an evolutionary disadvantage.
Direct Coupling: Critics argue that perception is a form of direct "coupling" with the environment (Ecological Psychology), where the brain is transparently tuned to the world's features rather than watching a screen.
Summary of Arguments
| Argument | Core Objection |
| Skepticism | We can never verify if the "representation" matches the "reality." |
| Berkeley's Likeness | A mental thought cannot "look like" a physical, unthinking matter. |
| Homunculus | It requires an "inner eye" to see the "inner image," explaining nothing. |
| Ockham’s Razor | It multiplies entities unnecessarily by adding "sense-data." |
Would you like me to contrast these arguments with the "Argument from Illusion," which is the primary reason many philosophers find indirect realism compelling in the first place?
Tuesday, March 3, 2026
Paranoia?
Från Aftonbladet någonstans. Så "paranoian" om att Kina kan kontrollera våra mobiler och trafikkameror kanske inte är paranoia, trots allt...
>>>USA:s och Israels underrättelsetjänster hade enligt tidigare uppgifter realtidsinformation om ayatollans position. Nu har ännu fler detaljer framkommit. Enligt Financial Times hade Mossad sedan flera år kontroll över nästan alla trafikkameror i Teheran.
>>>De israeliska agenterna hade dessutom hackat sig djupt ner i Irans mobiltelefonsystem, vilket både bidrog till övervakningen och gjorde att masterna närmast palatset kunde slås ut just före attacken.
Actions have consequences
Donald Trump is angry at various European nations for not supporting the ongoing military strikes against the Iranian regime. Or not supporting them hard enough. Or something. Or something else.
That the Spanish left-wing government refuses to support Trump is perhaps unsurprising, but even the UK (which is usually subservient to the US even under Labour governments) has tried to wiggle themselves out of the situation.
OK, let´s see...
It´s virtually an official policy of the Trump admin to split the European Union. Trump threatened military action against Denmark (a NATO member-nation) over Greenland. He has imposed tariffs on the EU and its member-nations. He is also trying to appease Russia in Ukraine.
So why exactly should the EU (or the pro-EU government of the UK) support him now? Maybe European alliances also has "interests", rather than "friends", you know. Oh, and as I pointed out in some previous blog post, it´s not as if the European panhandle is unimportant to the "nationalist" United States. Trump apparently needs military bases in Spain and on Cyprus to bomb targets in Iran. Wow, who knew. It´s almost as if a de facto global power needs allies globally or something...
Europe (perhaps minus France?) would probably have supported the strikes against the Iranian regime if the United States had a Democrat or Neo-Con president. Maybe they will, eventually. But as of now, it looks as if Trump may actually be more adventurist than George W Bush!
Seismic discovery?
With all due respecc to this content-creator, this is click bait about a nothing-burger. So there may have been an earthquake in the Dead Sea in the same decade as Jesus was crucified in Jerusalem? In a region were there are always earthquakes? And that proves...what? Nothing in particular, of course.
If the Gospel accounts were accurate, why didn´t Josephus mention both the eclipse, the earthquake *and the massive resurrection of the saints* which allegedly took place at the death of Jesus on the cross? Exactly.
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