Underleverantör

 

Okej, det här var intressant...

Stenas fartyg ingår i amerikanskt militärprogram

Splits and fusions

 

Credit: Rjruiziii

“The Ismailis: Their History and Doctrines” is a voluminous and extremely detailed book by Farhad Daftary. I read the first (1990) edition years ago, and now I´ve also devoured most of the second edition from 2007. The Ismailis, Ismaili or Ismailites (not to be confused with the Biblical Ishmaelites) are a branch of Shia Islam. Or rather several branches! Their history is notoriously complex, unfolding in several quite different theatres: North Africa, Syria, Persia, Yemen and India. Sources are often meager, except those written by hostile outsiders. Since the Ismailites were frequently conspiratorial or persecuted, much original literature have been lost or is jealously guarded by small Ismailite communities. For centuries, the Ismailite Fatimid dynasty ruled an empire centered on Egypt, but when their regime was overthrown by Saladin, this "hero" destroyed their House of Learning with its large library...

Daftary begins his "door-stopper" by debunking the myth of "The Old Man on the Mountain" and "The Assassins". Apparently, all the stories we´ve memorized by heart about the hashish, the paradise garden and the beautiful young maidens are just romantic tall tales, mostly of a medieval Crusader provenance (and Marco Polo). What *is* true is that the so-called Nizari Ismailites really did carry out a long string of assassinations of political opponents (or acts of terrorism, if you like). Their Arab opponents referred to the Nizaris as "hashasheen" or hash-smokers, from which the European word "assassin" is derived. And, of course, all the hash legends! In Arabic, however, the word´s connotation at the time was "underclass rabble" rather than literal users of cannabis-derived drugs.

To summarize Daftary´s 760-page long book is impossible (over 200 pages seem to be footnotes), but a few things stand out. It´s frequently asserted that Khomeini turned Shia Islam revolutionary, probably inspired by Communism, and that the original religion was quietist. In reality, Shia Islam has always oscillated between revolutionary and conservative periods, and also between openness and concealment. Khomeini´s activities are no mystery. The original Shiites were probably revolutionaries, including the proto-Ismailites. On the "far left" of the Shia spectrum stood the Qarmatians, who ruled a "socialist" state centered on Bahrain. The Qarmatis even attacked Mekka and stole the black stone! On the "far right" we have Jafar al-Sadiq, who could perhaps be regarded as the "founder" of Shia Islam proper. Jafar is recognized as an imam (spiritual leader and esoteric exegete) by Ismailites and Twelver Shias alike, and is respected even by Sunni Muslims. The Fatimids ended up somewhere in the center of this spectrum, while the Nizaris are more to the "left". 

Another thing that stands out is that history always repeats itself (it´s almost as if the Shia idea of "cycles" is true - or not really, since their cycles are supposed to have a Messianic consummation). The Middle East has virtually always been war-torn, brutal and Machiavellian. In Daftary´s book, the Crusaders are a supporting act, not the evil imperialists everything revolves around (a common trope in both the modern Muslim world and among Western leftists). Oh, and suicide attacks were just as common during the Middle Ages as they are today. It´s not clear what could impose order on this volatile region - a centralized empire, perhaps, and even that only barely (since there is usually more than one). Another repeating theme is the revolution betrayed by its own leadership. The Abbasids used revolutionary Shia ferment to overthrow the Umayyads...and then quickly turned against the radicals, becoming aristocratic Sunnis instead. The Safavids used the Qizilbash to take power in Persia, and of course turned against them and other radical Shia or Sufi groups while consolidating their quasi-theocratic Twelver Shia regime. Even the Ismailite Fatimids follow this pattern, becoming more conservative and "Byzantine" when firmly entrenched in power in Egypt than they had been ditherto. 

And speaking of the Fatimids...

Fatimid Egypt is sometimes used as a splendid example of "Muslim religious tolerance", but the background is never explained. As a ruling Shia minority in predominantly Sunni Egypt, the Fatimids tried to broaden their social base by allying with Coptic Christians and Jews. As already noted, Saladin - often depicted as some kind of Christ-like figure by Western Islamophiles - was the destroyer of this relatively tolerant dynasty in the name of orthodox Sunni Islam (when he wasn´t busy executing Suhrawardi). It´s also interesting to note that the Fatimids even when settling down as the rulers of an imperial polity nevertheless fomented rebellious sentiments in other Muslim lands through a vast network of Ismaili missionary organizations. In modern times, we have an obvious parallel case in...Soviet Communism.

Daftary is very positive towards the Nizari Ismailites during their "Alamut period", precisely the period when they were known as the Assassins. To Daftary, the Persian Nizaris were a kind of Persian nationalists against foreign (Seljuk and Mongol) domination. They also represented the interests of the poor, downtrodden and oppressed masses in both town and country. Hasan-i Sabbah (the bad guy of much anti-Ismailite polemics) is the hero of this story. Although the author never says it aloud, Hasan-i Sabbah comes across as a Lenin: an austere, ascetic and stern man who was also a genial organizer and revolutionary strategist. But somewhere here, we also see a problem. The leaders of the Nizari Ismailites were obeyed almost without question, they were seen as infallible gurus or even god-like figures, and the Nizaris suffered virtually no splits even though the U-turns of the leadership could be pretty dramatic. In other words: the Assassins were a cult! Or perhaps an early version of a Stalinist vanguard party...

Which brings me to the religious aspect of the equation. Shia Islam believes that while prophets reveal an exoteric or public message (as when God instructed Muhammad to reveal the Quran), there is also a hidden revelation. This esoteric message is explained (perhaps only to initiates) by the imam. The first imam of the Islamic dispensation was Ali. All subsequent imams are supposed to be descendants of Ali, and they are also supposed to be designated by the previous imam during his lifetime. Sometimes, this goes together with strong apocalyptic expectations. All these things create constant problems for the Shia, when imams are killed before they can appoint a successor, change their designations, or fail to inaugurate the parousia. Hence, the constant disputes over who has the right to the imamate, and all the creative theological "solutions" to the inability of the imams to live up to the expectations. There are "hidden" imams, representatives of the imams, and (I think) representatives of the representatives. The prophetic cycles are constantly prolonged with various excuses. In one form of Ismailism, the final Qaim (Messiah) won´t appear until 130 billion years into the future, although I´m sure even on this reckoning you could get in trouble if some partial Qaim doesn´t show up on time! On the "positive" side, I suppose the ability of the imams to simply change the message at will does give the Ismailites a certain resilience, since they can simply adapt to changed circumstances. The modern Nizaris, led by the Aga Khan, are far from revolutionary...

The esoteric side of Ismailism is fascinating, but also difficult to understand. The various systems have affinities with Gnosticism, Neoplatonism and Kabbala. There are similarities to Hindu notions of gurus, avatars and cycles. Daftary makes a valiant attempt to sort out these doctrines, but I´m not sure if he entirely succeeds. As an aside, he also mentions the peculiar Druze religion, since it began as an Ismaili faction devoted to the deification of Fatimid caliph-imam al-Hakim.

"The Ismailis: Their History and Doctrine" is hardly an introductory work in any sense of that term, but if you really are into Shiite historiography (or even hierohistory), I suggest you give it a try!

Tougher than a Swedish Viking

 

OIC resolution? What OIC resolution?!
Credit: Cruzados 

I wonder what the OIC would have said about this guy...

Abu Tahir al-Jannabi

Paludan vem?

Credit: Cruzados 

Den här killen var betydligt mer bejsad än den där lille rättshaveristen från Danmark...

På engelska. 

Abu Tahir al-Jannabi

Peace, or just peace in our time?

The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have recognized the State of Israel. According to rumour, Sudan, Oman or even Saudi Arabia might be next. The peace agreements have been brokered by the United States, more specifically by Jared Kushner, Donald  Trump's son in law. They are being hailed as a great breakthrough, at least by supporters of the Trump Administration.

Well, I'm skeptical. Don't the nations involved in this unexpected peace process have at least *something* in common? Of course they do. They are all opposed to Iran. This is simply an attempt by the United States to create a more firm anti-Iranian alliance. It comes after Trump ordered the assassination of one of Iran's top leaders, and after a series of mysterious explosions both in Iran and other Mideast nations, seemingly directed at Iranian interests.

The closer cooperation between Iran, China and Russia is another reason why the conservative Gulf monarchies have decided to move even closer to the United States. Note also the escalating "cold war" between the US and China, and a potential conflict with Russia over Belarus. 

The agreement will perhaps also give the United States increased leverage over Turkey, a NATO member which doesn't seem to know its place in the American-led pecking order.

Now, I'm not a great fan of the Iranian regime. However, in order to really be about "peace", this alliance must do something *truly* radical. Say, broker a peace agreement in Syria. How about letting the secular regime stay in power, let the refugees return, and evacuate all foreign troops and mercenaries?

That might perhaps be worth a Nobel peace prize. That, and a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

What is happening now is simply that the marriage of convenience between Israel and the conservative Arab states is being formalized in anticipation of the next Mideast war...